Es la primera vez que son divulgados datos consolidados sobre desapariciones en Brasil, aunque los números pueden ser mayores debido a la falta de investigaciones
Segundo informe de monitoreo y análisis de la FIP sobre los principales avances y dificultades del proceso de sustitución de cultivos de coca y cómo hacerles frente
Experts were predicting that putting its provisions into place would be far more challenging. A year after Colombia’s historic peace treaty was signed, they appear to be right
La Misión de la ONU ha desplegado personal de la Misión y avanza en el proceso de verificación de éste incidente de acuerdo a los protocolos establecidos por las partes
The 50-year civil war is over but, in the Cauca Valley, indigenous communities are on frontline of fight against drug gangs, riot police and deforestation
Organizaciones sociales denunciaron la muerte de Ramón Alcides García un reconocido líder impulsor del proceso de sustitución voluntaria de cultivos ilícitos en Briceño e integrante de Marcha Patriótica
In some cases, we found that the detained were forced to pay bribes in order to avoid arrest. In others, police tortured individuals to force a “confession”
Una controvertida actuación de diplomáticos mexicanos y peruanos logró que, a espaldas de la justicia, se liberara un gigantesco cargamento de madera de origen ilegal extraída del corazón del Amazonas
The High Commissioner acknowledged the Government’s attempts to address impunity for past crimes committed during the military dictatorship of 1973 to 1985, but highlighted the lack of progress in providing victims with truth, justice and reparation
“China has the capacity but not the willingness to do it, and that’s why Venezuela is so desperate to get the Russian support. There is no other way out”
To the surprise of some, the Democratic Action party also joined the boycott. Its candidates won four governorships in October’s vote and then infuriated many opposition supporters by swearing loyalty
El año 2017 muestra dos extremos, por una parte se acentúa el declive de la democracia, al mismo tiempo que los avances económicos de la región indican la menor cantidad de hogares con dificultades para llegar a fin de mes, desde 1995
Other than a meeting with a visiting civil-society leader from the U.S.-Mexico border, I should be in the office today. I’ll be writing and catching up on correspondence and other tasks that have fallen behind during this rather intense month.
Tras cuatro años de trabajo, las 15 veredas de Rescate las Varas fueron declaradas territorio libre de cultivos ilícitos. Sin embargo, las Farc, el ELN y las bandas criminales que controlaban el narcotráfico los asolaron e impidieron que el éxito se mantuviera
“El Paisa” salió hace algunos días de su zona de reincorporación, en el caserío Miravalle del municipio de San Vicente del Caguán, en el departamento sureño del Caquetá, lo que había generado confusión sobre su continuidad o no en el proceso de paz
En el norte del Cauca confluyen todas las problemáticas sociales, de disputa por la tierra, de auge del narcotráfico, y de grupos disidentes y emergentes, que convierten a esta región en una bomba de tiempo. Pero es posible frenarla
Si esta semana no se define el futuro de la reforma política, la estatutaria de la Jurisdicción Especial de Paz y la personería jurídica del partido de las Farc, se habrá hecho trizas el principio de un acuerdo
Isacson habla sobre el “tono hostil” de Estados Unidos con Colombia desde la llegada de Trump a la Casa Blanca, la vía que usa la derecha nacional para influir en ese gobierno en contra del de Santos
El Frente de Guerra Occidental Omar Gómez del Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Eln) reconoció este domingo ser el autor del homicidio del gobernador indígena Aulio Isarama Forastero, quien fue asesinado el pasado 25 de octubre
The evidence, the lawyers said, points to a plot against Ms. Cáceres that was months in the making and reached up to senior executives of Desarrollos Energéticos, known as Desa
Desde la academia y algunas ONG, especialistas coinciden que durante el actual sexenio la enfermedad se expandió tanto que su cura es el gran desafío para el próximo Presidente
El más reciente informe anual de la DEA acusa a las organizaciones criminales mexicanas de dominar el tráfico de drogas, pone especial preocupación por la aumento de la disponibilidad de heroína
Andres Marcelo Diaz Fernandez, “Es Tortura” (FUNDAR, SinEmbargo (Mexico), October 30, 2017).
El caso Nochixtlán pasa de ser un mero conflicto magisterial en contra de una evaluación educativa, para convertirse en un lamentable prisma de violaciones de derechos humanos
Debido a cambios recientes y a la falta de soluciones a problemas históricos, la región se enfrenta a un grave riesgo de retrocesos en materia de derechos humanos
I’m in Colombia-related meetings nearly all day: a several-hour “annual consultation” with USAID’s human rights program, and a meeting and a dinner with a visiting NGO leader and a journalist. I’ll have very little time at a keyboard or on the internet today.
Here’s an English translation of a long and wide-ranging exchange with journalist Cecilia Orozco, which ran in Colombia’s El Espectador newspaper this morning. It was a good opportunity to explain (and vent about) the current state of U.S.-Colombian relations.
“Colombia doesn’t know which Trump it will have to face”: Adam Isacson
October 28, 2017 – 9:00 PM
Cecilia Orozco Tascón
Interview with Adam Isacson, a senior official at WOLA, an influential civil-society organization in Washington that promotes human rights on the continent. Isacson, a scholar of Colombian conflicts, talks about the United States’ “hostile tone” with Colombia since Trump’s arrival in the White House, the way the domestic right wing influences that government against Santos’s administration, and that false information it spreads to discredit the peace agreement.
Q: Despite the friendly letter Trump sent President Santos in recent hours, several signs from Washington would indicate that relations between the United States and Colombia are not, today, so sincere and in solidarity. Do you agree with this perception?
I would go further and say that the bilateral relationship has reached its worst moment since the government of Ernesto Samper. It’s not as serious as 1998—nobody’s going to revoke the visa of any top government official—but after almost 19 years of hardly any U.S. public criticism of Colombia, today there is a steady stream of scoldings, expressions of impatience, and of public distancing from the peace policy. The disagreements have ideological roots: a hard-line government has come to power in Washington, one very much in tune with the Colombian right. But the hostile tone comes from the President himself, who is also disrespecting allies elsewhere around the world, from NATO to Australia to Mexico.
Q: Do you think President Trump’s change of tone is sincere when he writes President Santos, in the last hours, in the following terms: “The United States is ready to support you in your counternarcotics efforts (and) simultaneously I am working diligently to combat internal consumption”?
I imagine that letter was written after several weeks of witnessing the negative result of the quasi-decertification language of September 13. It must have been obvious to them that the binational relationship was damaged and, perhaps, the words of the now-retired Bill Brownfield were the last straw. Diplomats must have insisted on making a conciliatory gesture. It’s important that it reaffirmed co-responsibility in drug policy, but Colombia does not know which Donald Trump it will have to face at any time. He can easily go on the attack again the next time he talks about the country.
Q: The most frustrating episode for the Santos government with respect to Trump was the quasi-decertification of the country due to the growth of hectares cultivated with coca leaf. He didn’t flunk Colombia, but he threatened to. Is that report a preamble to decisions that Washington may make soon, or is it pressure designed for the medium and long term?
Beyond a group of officials close to Trump, that statement was frustrating for everyone. Saying “we almost put Colombia in the same category as Venezuela” is a slap in the face and a serious strategic error. I was happy to read that, in a recent interview with El Tiempo, the former Assistant Secretary of State and former Ambassador in Colombia Bill Brownfield shared this assessment. That interview indicates that the hostile language came directly from the White House and not from the State Department. But from whom in the White House, if General Kelly (chief of staff, former commander of the Southern Command) knows and admires Colombia? It may be, rather, Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida), with whom Trump consults U.S. policy regarding Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia. Senator Rubio, in turn, frequently consults with Álvaro Uribe. Anyway, ultimately nobody believes that he will decertify Colombia. It’s another empty threat, like the “military option” for Venezuela, forcing Mexico to finance a wall or throwing “fire and fury” on North Korea.
Q: As you mention it, the Trump government may be close to the most conservative Colombian politicians. Since this group is the opponent of the Santos administration and the peace accord, is it possible that the American officials who make decisions in Washington are influenced by these domestic figures?
Yes. There is a sector of the Republican Party (and some Democrats too) that receives much of its information about Colombia via the opposition. But sometimes these critical perspectives also come from the Colombian community in the United States, which, like many diasporas, is more conservative than the population that lives in the country. That’s normal, it always happens. The problem arises when this information includes false information such as “the transitional justice mechanism is composed of people from the FARC who will submit the military to kangaroo courts” or that “stopping the fumigation of illicit crops was agreed in the peace accord.”
Q: After that first “barely scraping by” certification warning, the DEA published another report on the same subject: coca crops. Does that insistence imply that the United States is pressuring Colombia to abandon manual eradication and instead reactivate aerial spraying?
The DEA report is annual and its purpose is to report its production and trafficking estimates, which follow the same trendline as those of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). But at least the DEA report doesn’t blame the crop increase on the peace agreement—a distortion of reality that’s heard a lot in Washington—and reports on other serious factors that affect the phenomenon, such as the Gulf Clan [Colombia’s largest organized crime group]. Both the Obama administration—less noisily—and the Trump administration have said they would prefer aerial fumigation in Colombia: despite the evidence, many officials view this method as an “indispensable tool.” But they’re not seriously pressing the Santos administration to start it again. The real pressure may fall on the next administration [which takes power in August 2018].
Q: Colombian officials are between a rock and a hard place: on one hand, Washington demanding results on decreasing crops. And on the other, the peasant populations who want to collaborate with eradication but only if they’re offered an alternative means of subsistence. Is there a third way that respects the rights of peasants and that simultaneously makes eradication effective?
No solution exists that, first, manages to reduce crops in the short term and, second, maintains those reductions permanently. It’s either the first or the second: choose one. Obviously, the Trump administration is much more interested in the first: short-term reduction. But if eradication happens without establishing a government presence that can provide basic services, what will happen? There will be replanting almost immediately. The National Comprehensive Crop Substitution Program (PNIS), from the fourth chapter of the peace agreement, is also short-term if it is carried out without that basic state presence. Substituting crops for two years is fine, but what happens when those two years expire, but governance and services aren’t in place? The result would be the same: replanting. A long-term strategy is urgent. However, I believe—as former assistant-secretary Brownfield has said—that this year’s eradication will lead to a reduction in next year’s coca measures. I hope that this gives Colombia space to work on longer-lasting strategies free from constant scolding.
Q: What could be a sustainable strategy over time? It seems impossible…
A long-term strategy means that the government arrives in areas so abandoned that inhabitants go months or years without seeing any non-uniformed state representatives. Disarming the FARC was a good first step, because the government can now arrive in those areas without having to conquer territory. Reintegrating the FARC is crucial to maintaining this security, but that effort is lagging badly behind. The second step is to initiate large investments in the countryside, investments foreseen in the first chapter of the Agreement and in the programs of the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART). This implementation is also moving at a snail’s pace, and with very little budget. Once there is progress in these areas, eradication and substitution of crops can be done with some hope of long-lasting effects. But unfortunately, due to the pressures generated by the coca bonanza and Washington’s messages, Colombia is starting out with the last step.
Q: Do the increase in the use of police force against the civilian population and, despite this, the continuous increase in the number of hectares, show the failure of manual eradication and, along with that, of the pacts foreseen in the peace agreement?
It’s too early to judge the performance of the peace agreement pacts, whose implementation has barely begun. But the use-of-force episodes are symptomatic of what happens when forced eradication happens without the government offering even basic services to the population. People tend to resist going hungry. The most notorious example of this happened in Bolivia at the beginning of the century. There, the so-called Dignity Plan, supported by the United States, drastically increased forced eradication. And yes, there was a temporary reduction in coca. But also a movement of rejection that brought Evo Morales to national notoriety and then to the Presidency. Without the Dignity Plan, who would Evo Morales be today? Probably the head of a cocalero union, leading a social movement with little influence outside the far-off Chapare region.
Q: The United States also intends to reduce its economic assistance to Colombia, and if it is consistent with the general policies of the Trump administration, there will also be cuts in technical assistance, logistics, etc. Do these purposes indicate that the U.S. government might gradually withdraw its support for the peace accord and for the Santos government beyond the diplomatic words it sends?
The Trump government has sought to cut off both military and economic assistance to the entire world. For Colombia, its request to Congress for 2018, released in May, sought to reduce it from US$391 to US$251 million. (Approximately US$50 million more goes through the Defense budget). But the Republican majority in Congress has rejected that proposal, since they’re not completely following the “America First” slogan. The House decided to give US$336 million, and the Senate held the “Peace Colombia” package at 2017 levels, at US$391 million. Congress has not finished working on the aid budget for 2018, but the figures make clear that it is more interested in the peace accord’s success than the White House is.
Q: It has been reported in several media that Ambassador [Kevin] Whitaker’s replacement may be Joseph MacManus. If this appointment happens, would it be a demonstration that the United States is going to be more or less cooperative with Colombia and its peace accord?
Joseph MacManus has been a career diplomat since 1986, and diplomats usually conceal their personal political beliefs and serve the incumbent president. I don’t know him, because he has only spent a few years of his career working on Latin American issues. To some extent, his appointment is a relief: it had been rumored that the White House intended to appoint a “political” ambassador, that is, an ally from outside the professional diplomatic corps, someone who is a true believer in Trumpism. It may turn out that MacManus has such personal proclivities, but on the other hand, he was also a senior adviser to Hillary Clinton and John Kerry when they led the State Department in the Obama administration. That’s why some right-wing media outlets have reported opposition to MacManus from the most conservative quarters of the administration. We’ll see.
Q: But on the other hand, El Espectador reported what the web site The New American* described this as a “scandalous push to install MacManus as U.S. ambassador to Bogota…”
The New American is a small digital publication with a strong pro-Trump line, one of the right-wing outlets that seeks to block MacManus for being, in their opinion, too attached to the Obama administration. That group is pushing for Trump to name someone more “pure” in “America First” ideology. But in fact, the appointment of a hardliner is not likely to succeed because it would need Senate approval. And there, although the Republicans have 52 of 100 seats, a number of senators are now anti-Trump—among them the head of the Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Corker—and they would never vote for an ambassador with those attributes.
“Nobody should lose their life”
Q: The conflicts between peasants and the security forces are happening repeatedly. The situation in Tumaco, where there were several deaths, is symptomatic. Are Colombia and the United States responsible for this tension, whose pressure to reduce crops may have caused a rush to show results?
There’s a pattern here that I find extremely serious. In March, the United States and Colombia agreed on a six-point plan to reduce crops. The fifth point was “a strategy to deal with the political realities of coca growers’ protests driving away eradicators.” Since then, in public forums, former Secretary Brownfield complained severaltimes about eradication being frustrated by protests. “This is absurd,” he said in mid-September. “The government must give the Police and Army clear authorities and rules of engagement.” I imagine that, privately, the messages were stronger. My suspicion is that these pressures created an environment conducive to episodes like that of Tumaco. Instead of “you have to clarify your procedures for the use of force,” the message that was heard seems to have been “you have to hit the protesters harder.” No one, neither a coca-grower nor a security-force member, should lose his life to the pursuit of an ephemeral statistic of fewer hectares.
“The Colombian right has a semi-direct line to the White House”
Q: A few months ago there occurred a social incident that was minor but not unimportant: the ex-presidents Uribe and Pastrana, opponents of Santos and the peace accord, may have cordially greeted Trump at Mar-a-Lago days before the latter received a visit from the Colombian head of state. What does that meeting mean to you?
Media reports indicate that Senator Rubio played a role in arranging that meeting. It’s a good example of how the Colombian right has established a semi-direct line to the White House to be heard on policy issues regarding their country.
Q: If the Trump administration were to withdraw its support for the peace accord altogether, how much do you think that would affect the success of the process in Colombia?
It would be very serious. The United States financed Colombia’s war a hundred times more generously than any other country. That’s why its political support for peace is so important. Withdrawing that support would take away an important source of legitimacy from the accord. Even now, the absence of a special envoy to Colombia (of the Trump government for accord-related matters) has left an important vacuum.
Amnesty International has stated on a number of occasions that the effective implementation of the Peace Agreement in territories historically affected by violence could contribute to the nonrepetition of such crimes
Las dos disidencias de las Farc que anunció el Ejército la semana pasada que aparecieron en Putumayo son insignificantes en número de hombres armados. Pero ya se están convirtiendo en una amenaza para los acuerdos de sustitución
“Estados Unidos está listo para apoyarlo en sus esfuerzos en sus esfuerzos antinarcóticos. Simultáneamente estoy trabajando diligentemente para combatir el consumo internamente”
The new initiative aims to discourage people from leaving Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala by funding projects over the next six months to improve the economies and security situation
Consecuencia de la pulseada: se comienzan a desbaratar algunas de estas redes, y, como símbolo, algunos de sus dirigentes van a parar a la cárcel. Pero los poderes ocultos siguen vivos, operativos
Agency officials said they would test the mock-ups over the next few months to determine which worked best in curbing illegal immigration and drug trafficking
Only about one-third (32%) of Americans near the border and 35% of those living further away from the border approve of the proposed wall. Mexicans are overwhelmingly united in opposition
Ante la falta de claridad sobre el tiempo que las fuerzas armadas deberán permanecer realizando labores de seguridad pública, es necesario que el Congreso las dote de ‘‘certeza jurídica’
Solicitan al Secretario General y al sistema de las Naciones Unidas que contribuyan a atender dicha crisis y las continuas violaciones de los derechos humanos
Two of the judges turned in their resignations, one is under house arrest in Venezuela and the remaining 30 fled across the Americas
Dorothy Kronick, Francisco Rodriguez, “15o: Fraud or Fatigue?” (Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, Washington Office on Latin America, October 27, 2017).
The presumption was that hungry and demoralized government backers would tire before committed pro-democracy protesters. Perhaps. But the data suggests this hasn’t happened yet
Young protesters, who saw hundreds of their fellow demonstrators jailed, injured or even killed in anti-Maduro street protests earlier this year, are disgusted by what for them is now a bleak political scenario
From Lima to London, prominent progressives, some within spitting distance of governing, still either actively defend the Venezuelan regime or resist calls to condemn its abuses
The FARC’s best hope will be to start local, in the rural areas where it has been a factor in Colombians’ lives for decades. One advantage the guerrillas have over other parties is thousands of presumably disciplined members on whom it can call to do political organizing. If its members are able to avoid a repeat of the wave of killings that devastated the Patriotic Union; if it builds a political base in these far-flung areas; and if it elects officials who avoid corruption and administer local governments efficiently and responsively, the FARC of the 2020s could blur Colombians’ bad memories and become a viable political force.
My schedule is mostly clear, but I’m very behind on a few writing projects, due to a very heavy schedule of meetings and events over the past few weeks. I’ll be reachable but hope to spend a few uninterrupted hours in “deep work” mode today.
He is earning himself a place in the history books as a president who ruthlessly used every available trick to avoid trial just as Brazil was stepping up its fight against corruption
Antes que llevar contingentes de soldados y policías para intensificar la erradicación forzada, debió solucionar el problema de la tenencia de la tierra, que ha enfrentado a comunidades afros ancestrales y a colonos durante los últimos 17 años
Sin concentración lo que dificulta la verificación internacional de la ONU; sin el mecanismo tripartito de verificación entre Onu, Gobierno y guerrilla, que no es compensado por la presencia de la Iglesia
La diplomática agregó que “estamos apoyando el proceso con una misión de observación por parte de nuestra Embajada, es un acto que hacemos en todos los países”
No hay indicios de cuándo puedan un regreso a los cuarteles debido a que las fuerzas de seguridad nacional que se prometieron al inicio del sexenio -como la Gendarmería- no fueron reforzadas
Esto no significa que la producción de heroína en México no haya ido al alza en años recientes. Pero sí implica que no podemos tomar como verdad revelada todo lo que dice la DEA
In 2016, three out of every four recorded murders of human rights defenders worldwide took place in the Americas, and 41% of these killings were of people standing up against extractive or development projects, or defending the right to land and natural resources of indigenous peoples
“The number of inbound flights to Honduras allegedly trafficking cocaine dropped 30 percent between 2015 and 2016, according to estimates from the United States government,” reads a letter to the New York Times editor, published yesterday, from the Honduran Presidency’s minister and adviser for strategy and communication.
But what happens when flights or boats suspected of bringing drugs to Honduras do make landfall? The news isn’t good.
The Honduran military, however, made few improvements in 2016 to increase overall capabilities to degrade and disrupt illicit trafficking. In the domain of maritime interdiction, no interdictions were recorded despite 100 actionable events supported by U.S. authorities. Many factors contribute to the low success rate in suppressing international narcotics trafficking off the Honduran coast.… Corruption further impedes progress, as trafficking organizations have infiltrated some military units in active drug corridors such as the Gracias a Dios Department and along the northern Caribbean coast.
I just looked back on my calendar. Since a week ago Monday (16th), I’ve helped host a big conference and an even bigger awards dinner, had nine meetings with congressional staff and one with the State Department, met twice with institutional funders, and guest-taught a college class.
I think that, in the category of “excuses for not getting any writing done,” that schedule is a pretty strong one.
Anyway, maybe I’ll get some writing done this afternoon. But first I have a morning meeting with a Pentagon official, along with a few other NGO colleagues, and lunch with a former WOLA colleague. I will hopefully be at my desk for a few hours after that.
In Monday’s New York Times, near the end of a piece about a notorious 2012 DEA-involved shooting incident in Honduras, this gem appears (boldface is mine):
Carson Ulrich, who served as deputy for the FAST team missions at the time of the Ahuas shooting, stands by the D.E.A.’s assertions that the passenger boat was searching for the drugs and had fired on the antidrug team.
Mr. Ulrich argued that the now-disbanded FAST program was “desperately” needed to “bring the rule of law to an area governed by the cartels.” The government inspectors general investigators were biased, Mr. Ulrich contended. “They are slandering heroes. I dare anyone to pick up a rifle and do what these American agents did.”
It’s a relief to say that Mr. Ulrich is no longer serving as a U.S. government employee. Nobody who would say this in a public forum should have any business governing America.
Hiding behind the nowverytired “how dare you question heroes who put lives on the line unlike you” dodge is even worse.
But still worse is how badly Mr. Ulrich just doesn’t get why the Ahuás incident matters. It’s not the incident itself, it’s what happened before it, and especially what happened afterward.
Nobody accuses the DEA agents and the Honduran forces involved in the Ahuás massacre of malice. (Carelessness, yes, as the IGs’ report revealed bad gaps in training, coordination, and procedures. But not malice.) It was 4:00 AM, pitch dark. An agent and two Honduran cops were on a seized boat full of cocaine with a busted engine, floating down a river, poised to confront any traffickers aiming to re-take the seized drugs.
In the dark, the boat collided with another boat that turned out to be transporting civilians (it’s hot there and people sometimes travel before sunrise). Evidence seems to indicate that these civilian passengers didn’t fire, but Honduran forces accompanying the DEA team did. Four passengers died.
Mistakes happen. What shouldn’t happen is years of stubborn denial and insistence on a story that doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. What shouldn’t happen is hobbling that scrutiny by withholding information from Congress and even the U.S. ambassador. What shouldn’t happen is stonewalling and slow-walking independent government investigations. What shouldn’t happen is doing almost nothing to honor and make real reparations to the incident’s victims.
The Ahuás incident itself wasn’t the problem. The problem was what happened before, as Operation Anvil was being thrown together over some key officials’ misgivings and objections. The problem was what happened afterward, as the agency “circled the wagons” and refused to own up to the fact that something went badly wrong.
Prior combat experience could help an investigator understand how things went so badly in pre-dawn hours on a river in Honduras more than five years ago. But you don’t need to have “picked up a rifle” to object strongly to how DEA handled this awful incident’s “before” and “after.” Mr. Carson Ulrich, private citizen, misses the point entirely.
Su implementación, en territorios controlados por estructuras de crimen organizado que hoy manejan buena parte de la cadena del narcotráfico, no será nada fácil
Se detallan 5 de los negocios que tuvieron la municipalidad, el partido y Lima, exguardia presidencial y uno de los condenados por el asesinato de monseñor Juan Gerardi
A Border Patrol agent in his truck kept a watchful eye on the gathering, and curious children on the Mexican side peeked through the border fence at the people speaking at a small lectern set up in the desert
WOLA’s annual human rights awards/benefit went very well last night. Today, I’m accompanying our winners on a series of visits with House of Representatives staff. I’ll be hard to contact through any means of communication until the very end of the day.
Mr. Macri said he would call the country’s governors, key lawmakers and leaders in the judiciary to accelerate progress on labor and tax policy overhauls
Ese pulso lo lidera la Coordinadora de Cultivadores de Coca, Amapola y Marihuana, Coccam, una organización afín a la Farc que nació este año como vocera de los cocaleros
El 57 % de las personas que son optimistas frente a las negociaciones han presenciado homicidios en su barrio durante el último año, pero se inclinan por soluciones preventivas
La idea que surgió en el 2012 entre los presidentes Vladimir Putin y Daniel Ortega finalmente fue cristalizada
Read more at http://latincorrespondent.com/2017/10/nicaragua-rusia-centro/#bgp6LdFZ3XRIBYtL.99
While the current opioid crisis has received significant attention, other drugs of abuse remain prevalent. These include methamphetamine, cocaine, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and marijuana
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