Adam Isacson

Defense, security, borders, migration, and human rights in Latin America and the United States. May not reflect my employer’s consensus view.

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May 2018

The day ahead: May 31, 2018

I’m most reachable in the morning. (How to contact me)

Still getting my act together on this last day of May, after returning from travel. I have lots of border and Colombia work on deck for June and July, but I need several more hours of thinking and organizing to clear the decks and have the outlines of a plan.

I’ll be doing that today—and posting here less—when not in a lunch with Colombia researchers and a late-afternoon meeting with groups working on Colombia. Regular posting should resume tomorrow.

The day ahead: May 30, 2018

I’ll be most reachable in the afternoon. (How to contact me)

OK—after a week of traveling, adjustment to time zones, following Colombia’s presidential election results, and a meeting-filled day yesterday, today I’m finally back at a computer screen with proper internet access for an uninterrupted period.

I need a few hours this morning just to clear out the inboxes and plan what the next couple of months are going to look like. I have a mid-afternoon interview with an FBI agent to vouch for a longtime congressional staff colleague who’s getting a higher security clearance. And hope to spend the latter part of the afternoon reading the news I missed and writing a Colombia update.

This is a striking graphic

Although the peace accord was reportedly a low priority among Colombian voters, this graphic of Sunday’s first-round presidential vote shows a sharp divergence between the half of the country that voted “yes” for the FARC peace accord on October 2, 2016, and the half of the country that voted “no.”

Who won where yesterday in Colombia

Many thanks to GitHub user “infrahumano” for posting all municipal data about yesterday’s presidential election in Colombia. Crunching those numbers yields interesting results:

  • Poorer and historically conflictive parts of Colombia went for former Bogotá mayor Gustavo Petro.
  • Wealthier parts of Colombia went for former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo.
  • Parts of Colombia that are neither too poor nor overly wealthy went for Iván Duque, the candidate of ex-president Álvaro Uribe’s party.
  • Duque underperformed, and Fajardo overperformed, in big cities.
  • Duque ruled the countryside.

(Update 5:30PM: showing my work—here’s the Excel file I used to add up all of the below items. Also, a Google Sheet combining municipal data about this and past elections, among other data, from @infrahumano and La Silla Vacía.)

Overall result for the entire country:

  • Duque (right, “no” to FARC peace accord) 39%
  • Petro (left, “yes”) 25%
  • Fajardo (center-left, soft “yes”) 24%
  • Vargas Lleras (center-right, soft “yes”) 7%
  • De la Calle (center, “yes”) 2%

Historically conflictive territories went for Petro.

170 historically conflictive municipalities (those participating in the peace accords’ Development Programs with a Territorial Focus PDET, 10% of all voters):

  • Petro 40%
  • Duque 37%
  • Fajardo 10%
  • Vargas Lleras 9%
  • De la Calle 2%

Municipalities that voted “no” in the October 2016 plebiscite voted overwhelmingly for Duque.

544 municipalities, 46% of voters:

  • Duque 48%
  • Fajardo 26%
  • Petro 16%
  • Vargas Lleras 7%
  • De la Calle 2%

(Added 7:30PM, using dataset from La Silla Vacía.)

Municipalities that voted “yes” in the October 2016 plebiscite went for Petro.

576 municipalities, 54% of voters:

  • Petro 34%
  • Duque 32%
  • Fajardo 22%
  • Vargas Lleras 8%
  • De la Calle 2%

Places that are not too poor, but not too wealthy, went heavily for Duque.

13 departments with 60-80% of their populations’ minimum basic economic needs met (44% of all voters)

  • Duque 46%
  • Fajardo 24%
  • Petro 21%
  • Vargas Lleras 7%
  • De la Calle 2%

Duque underperformed in the poorest and wealthiest places.

19 departments, plus Bogotá and overseas consulates, with less than 60% or more than 80% of populations’ minimum basic needs met (56% of all voters)

  • Duque 35%
  • Petro 29%
  • Fajardo 24%
  • Vargas Lleras 8%
  • De la Calle 2%

Petro won the poorest places.

10 departments with less than 55% of populations’ minimum basic needs met (15% of all voters)

  • Petro 42%
  • Duque 36%
  • Vargas Lleras 12%
  • Fajardo 7%
  • De la Calle 2%

Fajardo won the wealthiest places.

4 departments, plus Bogotá and overseas consulates, with 80% or more of populations’ minimum basic needs met (35% of all voters)

  • Fajardo 33%
  • Duque 32%
  • Petro 26%
  • Vargas Lleras 6%
  • De la Calle 2%

Duque underperformed, and Fajardo overperformed, in the biggest cities.

46 municipalities and one overseas consulate with at least 50,000 who voted for candidates (60% of all voters)

  • Duque 36%
  • Fajardo 30%
  • Petro 25%
  • Vargas Lleras 6%
  • De la Calle 2%

Duque overperformed in the countryside.

1,076 municipalities and 68 overseas consulates with fewer than 50,000 who voted for candidates (40% of all voters)

  • Duque 46%
  • Petro 26%
  • Fajardo 16%
  • Vargas Lleras 10%
  • De la Calle 2%

The past week in Colombia’s peace process

(Week of May 13-19)

Transitional Justice System Suspends Santrich Extradition

The case of FARC leader Seusis Pausias Hernández alias Jesús Santrich, arrested on April 9 with the possibility of extradition to the United States for narcotrafficking, grew more complicated this week. The Review Chamber of the new Special Peace Jurisdiction (JEP, the transitional justice system set up by the peace accord) ordered his extradition suspended. Other entities within Colombia’s government contended that the Chamber doesn’t have the right to do that.

Santrich, a hardliner who represented the FARC at the negotiating table during the entire Havana process, is currently confined at a Bogotá facility run by the Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference. His health is precarious, as he has been on a hunger strike since his arrest. Santrich is charged by a grand jury in the Southern District of New York with conspiring to send 10 tons of cocaine to the United States.

As he allegedly committed the crime after the peace accord went into effect, Santrich’s case could go to Colombia’s regular justice system, where he would face long prison terms or extradition. First, though, the JEP must determine that the crime did indeed take place after the peace accord’s December 1, 2016 ratification.

That is the task of the JEP’s Review Chamber, which must fulfill it within 120 days. This chamber contended, by a unanimous vote, that fulfilling its duty required a temporary suspension of Santrich’s extradition. The Chamber asked for more evidence of the allegations against the FARC leader, and instructed the “regular” justice system’s Prosecutor-General’s office (Fiscalía) to provide, within five days, information about the extradition process.

Prosecutor-General Néstor Humberto Martínez responded with a strongly worded 16-page letter alleging that the JEP has no authority to freeze an extradition process, adding that the newly formed body’s action “has left democratic institutionally threatened.” And in fact, the director of another body of the JEP, its Investigations and Accusations Unit, tweeted “I separate myself from the extradition suspension decision.”

The Colombian government’s Justice and Interior Ministries responded with a communiqué arguing that the JEP could not suspend Santrich’s extradition because the United States had not formally requested it yet. Colombian law gives countries requesting a citizen’s extradition 60 days to issue a formal request after that citizen has been detained. That would give the U.S. government until June 8 to issue the request. It has not done so, perhaps out of a desire not to appear to be influencing the May 27 presidential election campaign.

The JEP Chamber, however, stated that in its view, “the extradition process has already begun, because a detention for extradition purposes has been requested.”

There is no sense of when the Chamber may issue its determination of when Santrich committed a crime, or whether the Chamber may seek to determine whether there is even enough evidence that a crime took place. “Still, the political effect of the decision is immediate,” wrote Juanita León, director of La Silla Vacía.

Above all when the JEP issues it a few days before elections in which the candidate with the best chances of making it to a second round and reaching the Presidency [Iván Duque of the right-wing Centro Democrático party] proposes to make “adjustments” to the JEP that, in practice, would do away with it.

Debate over whether to extradite Santrich continues. Rodrigo Uprimny, founder of the judicial think-tank DeJusticia, believes Santrich should be tried in Colombia so that he may answer to his victims. An analysis in Semana magazine worries about the effect on ex-guerrillas’ desertion:

In the end, the consequences won’t be those of an ideal transition to peace or a return to the open war of the last decades. The scenario in play is intermediate, and has to do instead with the size of the dissidences that may return to the jungle. In other words, if Santrich’s possible extradition creates uncertainty among guerrillas that increases the number of dissidents, it may be best to allow him to serve his sentence inside the country.

An El Tiempo editorial contends that “rules are rules,” despite Santrich’s victims’ right to learn the truth from him.

It could be proposed that, without leaving aside at any moment the importance of the truth, the precept must come first that whoever doesn’t comply with the agreed rules must pay for it.

This, the editorial clarifies, only applies if the evidence against Santrich “leaves no doubt about his criminal conduct.” If so, “there would be no reason to insist that this [his extradition] poses an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of what was agreed in Havana.”

Government Will Miss Its Coca Substitution Target

The Colombian government recognized on May 15 that it will not meet its target, set for this month, of 50,000 hectares of coca eradicated by growers voluntarily destroying their crops in exchange for economic assistance. That was the one-year goal the Presidency had set for its implementation of chapter 4 of the Havana peace accord, which establishes a national crop substitution program.

In fact, the program fell significantly short. Eduardo Díaz, the director of the crop substitution program, announced that families participating in the program had eradicated 36,000 hectares, of which 11,700 have actually been verified by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The U.S. government measured 188,000 hectares in Colombia in 2016, and media have reported that the U.S. estimate for 2017 could be as high as 230,000. (UNODC’s 2016 estimate was 146,000, and media reports point to 180,000 in 2017.) The government forcibly eradicated 53,000 hectares in 2017.

Díaz blamed security conditions for the shortfall. He told CNN en Español, “In different zones where there are crops, narcotraffickers’ networks have advanced, have killed communities, have killed leaders, have threatened government officials and UN officials.”

Independent analysts place more blame on the slow performance of the Colombian bureaucracy. The idea of the government’s National Comprehensive Illicit Crop Substitution Program (PNIS, the main focus of the accord’s chapter 4) was to provide small-scale coca-growing households with two years’ worth of payments and help with productive projects in exchange for eradicating their coca. The economic benefits for each household would total about US$12,000 over two years. This week, the Ideas for Peace Foundation released a detailed report and dataset (Excel file) laying out the progress of the PNIS program as of March 31. In sum:

  • 123,225 families had signed collective framework community accords agreeing in principle to substitute crops.
  • 62,181 families (50.4 percent of above) had signed specific accords committing to a timetable of voluntary eradication and receipt of benefits.
  • 32,010 families (51.4 percent of above) had received at least one monthly payment.
  • 7,009 families (11 percent of the 62,181) had received any technical assistance to pursue an alternative productive project.
  • UNODC had found (in 2106) 22,025 hectares of coca in the municipalities (counties) where families had begun receiving payments.
  • UNODC had verified and certified the eradication of 6,381 hectares of coca (28.9 percent of above). (This is far fewer than the 11.700 hectare figure that the government substitution program’s Eduardo Díaz had given CNN.)

The report concludes,

The greatest advances of PNIS are found in the signing up of campesinos and the disbursement of payments, while it is falling most behind in technical assistance and in the supply of goods and services. Under those conditions, three months before the end of President Santos’s government, it will be difficult for the program to meet the goal of 50,000 voluntarily eradicated hectares.

The Ideas for Peace report notes that while homicides across Colombia have increased by a troubling 8 percent over this time last year, they are up by a very alarming 57 percent in the municipalities with crop substitution programs.

The Verdad Abierta website visited Briceño, Antioquia, where the PNIS began as a pilot project in 2015. In the coming weeks, the national government is to announce that the municipality’s residents will have eradicated all of their coca, about 567 hectares.

However, Briceño’s farmers told the site that “the campesinos complied, but the government has not.” While monthly payments have come on time, assistance for productive projects has hardly begun. “They did give us the payments, but in the agreement it said that as the payments arrived, then the productive projects to implement them would also arrive, so that we wouldn’t end up the way we are now: with our arms crossed and worried because the money has run out,” said a Community Action Board president.

“The state has a great responsibility with respect to the families who expressed their will to abandon the coca crops and who took part in the substitution process,” the Ideas for Peace report reads. “In the zones where the PNIS began to be developed, the link between populations and the state has been re-established. However, the lack of compliance with what was agreed not only has implications for institutions’ trust and credibility, it generates a risk of re-planting and a possible increase in hectares of coca.”

ELN to Cease Fire During Presidential Voting

The ELN announced that it will cease military activities for five days, from May 25-29, “to contribute to favorable conditions that might permit Colombian society to express itself in the elections” that will take place on May 27.

This raised hopes for a more permanent bilateral cessation of hostilities between government and guerrillas. However, the ELN’s chief negotiator in Havana, Pablo Beltrán, intimated that the group would be unlikely to agree to a ceasefire as long as social leaders continue to be killed at a rapid pace around the country: “We are fully disposed to do a cessation, but what about all the others? It’s not just a call on the military forces, but on paramilitarism, on all these attacks that different popular sectors are receiving.”

Asked about President Juan Manuel Santos’s hope that the ELN talks will leave behind a framework agreement—which, for the next president, would increase the cost of pulling the plug on the talks—Beltrán said that the ELN wants “to leave the accords at such a point of consolidation that any incoming government would have to respect them.” Any advancement, Beltrán added, would have to include more civil society participation; he did not specify what that might look like.

Timoleón Jiménez to Uribe: Let’s Go To the Truth Commission Together

Maximum FARC leader Timoleón Jiménez alias Timochenko published a lengthy communiqué about the status of the peace process on the eve of Colombia’s presidential election. “The peace accord is shielded,” it reads.

That’s what the Constitutional Court understood when it upheld Legislative Act 02 of 2017. The UN Security Council recognizes it. The community of nations accepts it and applauds it. We’re not going to force absolutely anything, the issue is simply to honor what was agreed when the Colombian state and our former insurgency gave our word. The beautiful dream of peace could be an irreversible reality if you [President Santos] decide to act.

Timochenko’s tone contrasts with that of the FARC’s de facto number-two leader, Iván Márquez, who said that if his close collaborator Jesús Santrich dies of a hunger strike while awaiting a possible extradition, his death “would also be the death of the peace process.”

In his statement, Timochenko asked forgiveness of Ingrid Betancourt, Clara Rojas, Sigifredo López, and other civilians whom the FARC held hostage for years. He called on former President Álvaro Uribe to join him in appearing together before the newly established Truth Commission to show the country “what the search for truth and the clarification of the truth look like.” Uribe led an intense military offensive against the FARC during his 2002-2010 presidency, and enjoyed the political support of many backers of right-wing paramilitary groups.

The presidential candidate of Uribe’s party, poll frontrunner Iván Duque, rejected the FARC leader’s invitation. “He can’t come here like a shameless person trying to appear as the equal of a good citizen. Instead, they should give reparations to their victims, tell all the truth, and pay their penalties.”

Military Operations Against FARC Dissidents

A joint Colombian Army-Air Force-Police operation killed 11 members of the FARC’s 7th Front dissident group in Putumayo. Among the dead was a commander named alias “Cachorro,” reportedly a close collaborator of Edgar Salgado, alias “Rodrigo Cadete,” who commanded the FARC’s 27th Front and abruptly abandoned the demobilization process last September. The 7th Front dissidents are a recent presence in Putumayo; they have been most active in Meta and Caquetá.

In Bello, just north of Medellín in Antioquia, an operation carried out by the Army and the Fiscalía captured Henry Arturo Gil Ramírez alias “el Feo” (the Ugly One), a top commander of the 36th Front dissident group.

In-Depth Reading

George Orwell’s Barcelona

This building in central Barcelona was once the Hotel Continental, where George Orwell and his wife stayed when he wasn’t at the front, fighting with an anti-Stalinist Marxist militia during the Spanish Civil War. Here is where this scene in Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia played out, just as the pro-Soviet communists began their crackdown on all other leftist factions:

When I got to the hotel my wife was sitting in the lounge. She got up and came towards me in what struck me as a very unconcerned manner; then she put an arm round my neck and, with a sweet smile for the benefit of the other people in the lounge, hissed in my ear:

Get out!

‘What?’

‘Get out of here at once!’

‘What?’

‘Don’t keep standing here! You must get outside quickly!’

‘What? Why? What do you mean?’

…‘Haven’t you heard?’

‘No. Heard what? I’ve heard nothing.’

‘The P.O.U.M.’S been suppressed. They’ve seized all the buildings. Practically everyone’s in prison. And they say they’re shooting people already.’

There are very few remaining signs that, for more than a year in 1936-37, this city was actually run by anarchists and labor unions. (It didn’t last: the Stalinists routed them, and then by 1939 the dictator Franco defeated the Stalinists. The Wikipedia entry on “Revolutionary Catalonia” is a good summary.)

I’m grateful to Alan Warren, who offers tours of Orwell’s Barcelona, for pointing those signs and places out to me. It was a great two-hour break from the Latin American Studies Association conference taking place elsewhere in the city.

This hand-painted sign in Catalán, declaring this square to be the “Plaza of the Unknown Militiaman,” is one of the only remnants of the brief period of anarcho-syndicalist dominion of Barcelona. It was covered by a wooden board until 2004.

 

My LASA presentation slides

If I were smarter, I’d have recorded my Latin American Studies Association panel discussion and shared the audio as a podcast, like Greg Weeks did.

Instead, here’s the 36-slide presentation I used to explain the experience of U.S. support for Colombia’s peace process under the Trump administration. It’s below, or just download the 16mb PDF file here. Scroll further down for a quick overview.

In a nutshell, here’s the story this is trying to tell.

Since Trump’s inauguration, there have been three battle lines:

  1. How to talk about Colombia’s peace accord.
  2. How to talk about Colombia’s coca production problem.
  3. What the aid package should look like.

And there have been four key sets of actors in Washington:

  1. The Trump White House.
  2. Veteran diplomats and other pragmatic officials.
  3. Foreign aid appropriators and foreign relations authorizers in Congress.
  4. Hardliners in Congress. (Sen. Marco Rubio, who has played a big role, straddles 3. and 4.)

Spoiler: so far at least, (2) and (3) have won the day on all three battle lines. But if Colombia elects Duque, and if Trump, Bolton, and Pompeo harden the U.S. line and work the bureaucracy harder, the coming year could be much worse.

I have this all written out as a 19-page draft, still in need of unifying prose, edits, and footnotes. In the meantime, enjoy the slideshow, which has links to sources for nearly everything.

Day 3 in Barcelona

Here’s a photo from my early morning jog along the Mediterranean. I’m here for the Latin American Studies Association’s annual conference.

I like these gatherings, it’s good to see everyone from old professors to colleagues in the region. And it’s really important to find out about work being done by younger, newer (and less male and white) scholars.

Regular posting, including a new Colombia update I’ve been chipping away at, will resume soon.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington This Week

Tuesday, May 22

  • 9:00–11:00 at the Wilson Center: Rule of Law, a Linchpin of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Conversation with Senator Ben Cardin. (RSVP required).
  • 11:30–6:30 at the Stimson Center: Taking Aim: A Closer Look at the Global Arms Trade. (RSVP required).
  • 1:00–2:15 at the Wilson Center: One Month Out: New Perspectives on the 2018 Mexican Election. (RSVP required).
  • 2:00 in House Capitol Visitor Center Room 210: Hearing of the House Homeland Security Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee on “Stopping the Daily Border Caravan: Time to Build a Policy Wall.”

Wednesday, May 23

Thursday, May 24

The day ahead

I’ll be difficult to contact today, and all week. (How to contact me)

I’m in a staff meeting, then guest-teaching a Syracuse University in Washington class about Colombia, then headed to the airport. I’ll be flying overnight to Barcelona, where I’ll be all week at the annual Latin American Studies Association conference.

Some articles I found interesting this morning

Carolyn Cole photo at The Los Angeles Times. Caption: “Ely Fernandez of Honduras is questioned by Border Patrol Agent Robert Rodriguez after being detained for crossing the border illegally in March with his 5-year-old son, Bryan, center.”

(Even more here)

May 18, 2018

Brazil

The individuals did not know one another but allegedly were using the messaging app WhatsApp to discuss plans to conduct a terrorist attack

Cuba

Anti-Castro activists complained that the seminar, titled “Cuba under [Miguel] Díaz-Canel” and organized by the department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was to hear only from experts who support the friendlier policies on Cuba

El Salvador

Elías Antonio Saca, who was president of El Salvador from 2004 to 2009, and six other members of his administration, will stand trial for allegedly embezzling $300 million from state coffers into personal accounts

Guatemala

El primer día de María Consuelo Porras Argueta como Fiscal General y jefa del Ministerio Público (MP), fue ajetreado; como una premonición de lo que serán sus días durante los próximos cuatro años

Mexico

Fully implementing the landmark anti-corruption reforms that Mexico approved in 2016 should be a major priority for whoever wins the country’s presidency on July 1

“We have never seen this before and it is affecting everyone,” he said

Asked about the possibility of a safe third country agreement in a television interview on Thursday morning, Luis Videgaray, Mexico’s foreign secretary, said, “There aren’t conditions to speak about new cooperation mechanisms in this matter.”

Venezuela

Even the rations served in military mess halls have dramatically diminished in size and quality. To compensate, soldiers are often given leave several hours during the day to hunt for meals off base

Shortages of food, evaporating salaries and desertions have turned the armed forces into a cauldron of conspiracies against Mr. Maduro

Many Venezuelans will go to the polls on Sunday hungry. And some may be voting in the presidential election only because they fear what will happen to them if they stay home

They are, in general, wealthier and more likely to have legal representation, an advantage that significantly boosts their chances of being allowed to stay

The latest salvo—targeting the man who is widely perceived as the most powerful man in the country behind the president—hits Mr. Maduro’s inner circle closer than any other previous sanctions

The day ahead: May 18, 2018

I’ll be reachable in the afternoon. (How to contact me)

I’m off shortly to talk about Colombia before a human rights seminar, a class of mostly civilians from around the region, at the National Defense University’s Perry Center. I’ll be in the office in the afternoon, working on my LASA paper and just trying to get re-organized in general after lots of writing this week.

Some articles I found interesting this morning

Witness for Peace photo at TruthOut. Caption: “Police from various units are present May 3 in Pajuiles, in northern Honduras, to escort dam construction machinery past a community resistance camp.”

(Even more here)

May 17, 2018

Central America Regional, Mexico

Even supporters of tougher enforcement should tell the White House that it is going too far. It can enforce immigration laws without such draconian measures and protect children

Colombia

Poco a poco los detalles sobre estas operaciones se han ido conociendo, y cuanto más se sabe más se profundiza el dolor al pensar cómo se pudo permitir que algo así ocurriera

Guatemala

The Florida senator has suspended US funding for a United Nations commission that has had dramatic success in tackling corruption in the Central American country

It is considered an easy domestic victory for Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales, whose government is beset by economic problems, gang violence and corruption allegations

Honduras

The recent crackdown in Pajuiles to impose a fiercely contested hydroelectric dam project is just one of the latest incidents, but it provides a clear example of the involvement of US-trained and -supported special forces in repression

Mexico

Because of Mexico’s dominant role as either a source or transit point for illicit drugs destined for the U.S., it has also become a primary destination for the illicit proceeds that the cartels earn

Approximately 1,218lbs. of illicit fentanyl have already been seized in FY 2018

Nicaragua

Ortega dejó el martes la sede del Seminario de Nuestra Señora de Fátima de Managua, donde se inauguró el diálogo, con una lista de asesinados por la represión leída en su cara, el descontento de los empresarios y una exigencia directa de la Iglesia de parar la violencia

Venezuela

The Cartel of the Suns today is a disparate network of traffickers, including both state and non-state actors, but all operating with the blessing and protection of senior figures in the Venezuelan government

Sooner rather than later, Venezuela’s government will face the reality that only austere economics — not spendthrift politics — can end hyperinflation

The process has been stacked against the opposition from the start

Mr. Falcón likes to argue that he is best positioned to lead the divided country because he came from the very party he aims to defeat

American Joshua Holt and several Venezuelan political dissidents made a desperate plea for help as inmates took control of a part of the Helicoide prison in Caracas

Western Hemisphere Regional

Even more threatening to the rule of law, though, has been selective prosecution — often unintentional on the part of anti-corruption crusaders

The judge did not simply rule against ICE. He accused the agency of lying to a court of law

Whether President Trump was referring to MS-13 gang members or all deportees is unclear. But he didn’t exactly hasten to clarify

Talking Colombian elections on WBEZ Worldview

Here’s an 11-minute interview from yesterday with Jerome McDonnell, the veteran and deeply knowledgeable host of Worldview on WBEZ, Chicago’s NPR station. We look at Colombia’s upcoming elections and the state of peace accord implementation.

These interviews, especially live ones like this, are nerve-wracking, even when it’s a topic I follow closely. Time is very limited, but you have to break things down for a general audience, which takes time. A voice in your head screams “hurry up you only have 10 minutes” while the rest of your brain wants to explain the complicated context. I end up talking too fast, and I honestly have no idea which facts/arguments audiences will find most compelling or boring. People who do this well are in high demand, because it’s hard to do well.

The day ahead: May 17, 2018

I should be reachable much of the day. (How to contact me)

I’ve completed a lot of the writing I’d hoped to do this week, with one big exception: the paper I’m to present next Wednesday at the Latin American Studies Association convention in Barcelona. Luckily I have a free schedule today and can spend several hours writing it. That’s what I’ll be doing until (and maybe after) dinnertime.

Some articles I found interesting this morning

Bienvenido Velasco/EFE photo at Confidencial (Nicaragua). Caption: “Manifestación en Managua contra el régimen de Daniel Ortega.”

(Even more here)

May 16, 2018

Brazil

A little like what was so often heard during the 2016 U.S. campaign about Donald Trump, the refrain “he says what I’m thinking but can’t say” comes up time and time again

Colombia

Kate Gilmore, la alta comisionada adjunta de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, habló sobre el proceso de paz en Colombia. Asegura que el caso Santrich pone a prueba la credibilidad de la justicia

Guatemala

In a strategic shift for the institution, the Guatemalan Army deployed troops to the borders and pulled patrols off the streets, beginning in early April

The next few days will be tense and determinant for President Morales

Mexico

“Mexico talks but they do nothing for us, especially at the border. They certainly don’t help us much on trade, but especially at the border they do nothing for us”

La Organización no Gubernamental Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez analizó las sentencias de amparo

Officials from the Trump administration and the Mexican government will meet Thursday and Friday to discuss a possible “safe third country” agreement

Nicaragua

El sondeo realizado a 1200 personas entre el 5 y 15 de mayo muestra que el 78% de los entrevistados opinan que el país va por mal camino. Una enorme diferencia en relación a la encuesta de enero, cuando el 35% opinaba lo mismo

Venezuela

De 32 ministros, 14 son militares y dirigen carteras como Defensa, Interior, Petróleo, Agricultura y Alimentación, además de la poderosa petrolera PDVSA

Here are seven arguments as to why we think Venezuela qualifies and what the implications are of this troubled Andean nation as a regional crime hub

For a leader so universally loathed to try to steal an election risks setting off a series of events that end with him out of power — perhaps even in jail

A flurry of videos that were posted on social media and could not be immediately verified purported to show El Helicoide’s inmates fleeing their cells and issuing pleas for outside help

The day ahead: May 16, 2018

I’ll be most reachable in the afternoon. (How to contact me)

We’ve got some Latin American visitors from a State Department exchange program late-morning, and I’ll be on WBEZ Chicago’s Worldview program around 1:20 Eastern time, talking about Colombia’s elections.

Before and after that, I’ll be finishing a presentation on human rights in Colombia I’ll be giving to the human rights class at the National Defense University’s Perry Center on Friday, and finishing an internal memo on Colombia. If there’s time, I’d also like to get started on a post for here explaining the National Guard at the border.

Some articles I found interesting this morning

Hans-Maximo Musielik photo at La Jornada (Mexico). Caption: “La obra fue realizada por reporteros mexicanos, y extranjeros, durante el fin de semana para denunciar el asesinato y desaparición de 140 periodistas desde 1999 hasta la fecha.”

(Even more here)

May 15, 2018

Central America Regional, Mexico

The caravan will take place around the same time as this year, as it has for the past 10 years

Colombia

Al 31 de marzo, 62.182 familias en 43 municipios se encontraban inscritas en el PNIS y el 51% de ellas había recibido al menos el primer pago

Don’t call Duque a sock puppet just yet. For all the Uribe-inflected campaign rhetoric, he has stopped short of saying he’ll try to revoke the peace plan

Colombia, Venezuela

“The most recent Venezuelans that are coming, they are in the worst situations. Now is really the escape of the desperate”

Cuba, Venezuela

Venezuela’s state-run oil firm PDVSA has bought nearly $440 million worth of foreign crude and shipped it directly to Cuba on friendly credit terms – and often at a loss, according to internal company documents reviewed by Reuters

Ecuador

Over more than five years, Ecuador put at least $5m (£3.7m) into a secret intelligence budget that protected the WikiLeaks founder

Guatemala

So far this fiscal year (which ends Sept. 30) about 5,500 family units have presented themselves at ports in the Tucson Field Office, up 38 percent from about 4,000 families during this time last fiscal year

Mexico

The troops operating and monitoring high-tech surveillance equipment along the border have been told they are prohibited from using it to look into Mexico

“They went to execute him,” Tabasco Gov. Arturo Nunez Jimenez said at a news conference, dispelling initial speculation that the shooting may have been a botched robbery

Huerta era conductor del noticiero Sin Reservas, además conducía el noticiero de televisión en el canal Notinueve

Nicaragua

Ortega has long been able to count on students, organized by Sandinista Front leaders in campus governments, as some of the most reliable backers of his leftist administration. But now many students are turning on him

Venezuela

The more the opposition votes, the more the regime will be forced to either cheat on Election Day or acknowledge publicly its electoral weaknesses, both of which will weaken Mr. Maduro within his own movement

Cruz’s statements reflect the opinion of many in the U.S. government, who back dialogue in good faith that seeks the restoration of democracy in Venezuela

Western Hemisphere Regional

There is no centralized, federal system to identify migrant remains, only a patchwork of state, local and volunteer efforts. So, when a would-be crosser doesn’t survive, his or her family is often left in limbo

Those facilities are at 91 percent capacity, the HHS official said, and the Trump administration’s crackdown plans could push thousands more children into government care

The science leads to the conclusion that the deprivation of caregiving produces a form of extreme suffering in children

The best song I washed dishes to tonight

“Emerald Rush” by Jon Hopkins (2018).

Jailing All Border Crossers and Separating Families Would Break U.S. Courts, Ports, and Prisons. (It’s Cruel, Too.)

Here’s a new border analysis at WOLA’s website. In a nutshell:

  • The Trump administration, especially Jeff Sessions, is proposing to prosecute and imprison every single person who crosses the U.S.-Mexico border “improperly.”
  • This would happen even if the border-crosser is someone seeking asylum. If the asylum-seeker is a parent with a child, they would take the child away from the parent, jail the parent, and send the child to a guardian.
  • A law dating back to 1952 allows them to do that. That law has never been fully enforced. Not because it’s cruel, but because of how it would break U.S. institutions.
  • It would nearly double the U.S. federal prison population in one stroke.
  • It would overwhelm ports of entry, the 45 official crossings along the border.
  • It would overwhelm federal courts at the border, which are already at or near capacity.

Read the analysis. It has lots of graphics, unlike this post.

The past week in Colombia’s peace process

(Week of May 6-12)

ELN Talks Restart in Havana

Government and ELN negotiators relaunched peace talks in Havana, Cuba on May 10, continuing a fifth round of negotiations that had begun in Quito, Ecuador on March 15. The process was interrupted on April 18 when Ecuador’s President, Lenin Moreno, suspended the country’s hosting of the negotiations. Moreno’s decision reflected a darkened national mood in Ecuador toward Colombian armed groups, after a FARC dissident group kidnapped and killed two journalists and their driver in March near the Colombia-Ecuador border.

This round of talks is covering three issues: the terms of a new bilateral cessation of hostilities, measures to shield communities in areas of combat between the ELN and other illegal armed groups, and a model for civil society participation in future rounds of talks, as envisioned in the negotiating agenda. “In the immediate term, this cycle will dedicate itself to agreeing on a new bilateral, temporary, and national ceasefire that is better than the last one,” said ELN chief negotiator Pablo Beltrán, referring to a 100-day bilateral ceasefire that was not renewed after it expired on January 9.

Negotiators are under pressure to come up with tangible results. In three months, Colombia will inaugurate a new president after electing a new one on May 27 (and probably after a runoff vote on June 17); most candidates have said they are unwilling to continue the peace talks in their current form. President Juan Manuel Santos and the Colombian Congress’s Peace Commission have both cited the need for a “framework accord” to lock in the talks before the next president takes office. While he realizes that he will not be the one to sign an accord with the ELN, Santos said his goal is to hand off to his successor “something that is on the right track.”

At a May 9 session of the congressional Peace Commission, diplomatic representatives from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Brazil, and Cuba expressed support for the ELN dialogues’ continuation. Most called on both sides to make swift progress. The European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Federica Mogherini, gave a statement of support and called on both sides to reach a ceasefire, “which would significantly improve the humanitarian situation in the areas most affected by the conflict.” At the congressional commission hearing, government negotiator José Noé Ríos declared a goal of May 25—two days before the presidential elections’ first round—for reaching agreement on a ceasefire.

In an apparent move to ease a ceasefire, President Santos signed a decree green-lighting a case-by-case review of people imprisoned on charges having to do with social protest. The idea is to identify individuals who could be amnestied, or have their sentences commuted. This would be a goodwill gesture responding to a longtime ELN demand that the government release people involved in protests.

In opening comments in Havana, ELN leader Beltrán said the government’s poor compliance with commitments in the FARC peace accord, along with an increase in killings of social leaders, have heightened the ELN’s distrust. He added the view, though, that “the only road for Colombia, for a political solution, is that this way of dialogue goes ahead.”

The Colombian government’s chief negotiator, former vice-president Gustavo Bell, voiced hope that this round of talks would bring not just a bilateral ceasefire but an ELN commitment to cease all hostilities, like “kidnappings, extortions, child recruitment, or attacks on infrastructure.” Obstacles to a cessation of hostilities include which illegal activity would be included; how to verify it without cantonment of fighters; how the ELN would confront other illegal armed groups; and how to guarantee that all ELN leaders agree to observe it.

Negotiators are also talking to social organizations from areas hit by conflict between the ELN and other groups, which wouldn’t so clearly feel the impact of an ELN-government ceasefire, to discuss commitments to observe international humanitarian law. Ethnic, victims’, and women’s organizations in Chocó, where fighting has raged between the ELN and the Urabeños organized crime group, have called for respecting ethnic territories, de-mining, stopping recruitment of minors, halting killings of social leaders, ending displacement and confinement, and curbs on illicit crops and illegal mining. In Nariño, where many small armed groups operate, civil-society organziations have been calling for more action on de-mining. In Catatumbo, groups are calling on the ELN to keep the civilian population out of its worsening conflict with the EPL (Popular Liberation Army, a small but regionally strong guerrilla group), which has displaced almost 9,000 people since fighting worsened on March 14.

Jesús Santrich Case

FARC leader Seusis Pausias Hernández alias Jesús Santrich was moved from Bogotá’s El Tunal hospital to the Fundación Caminos de Libertad, a facility run by the Episcopal Conference of Colombia’s Catholic church. Santrich, one of the FARC’s main negotiators in Havana who expected to assume a seat in Colombia’s Congress in July, has been on a hunger strike since his April 9 arrest. He was indicted by a U.S. court for allegedly conspiring to send 10 tons of cocaine to the United States in 2017, after the FARC peace accord was signed, and faces possible extradition.

Santrich’s health is flagging after a month of consuming only water and epilepsy medication. Still, he has turned down entreaties to abandon his hunger strike, including an open letter from longtime informal mediators Sen. Iván Cepeda and former mining minster Álvaro Leyva. The ex-guerrilla, a political hardliner, has said he would rather die than go to a U.S. prison.

Some voices have called for Santrich to be tried in Colombia, where he would face his victims, rather than be extradited. These include former government negotiator and current presidential candidate Humberto de la Calle, Human Rights Watch Americas Director José Miguel Vivanco, and Colombian jurist Rodrigo Uprimny, co-founder of the DeJusticia think-tank. “To extradite FARC commanders before they are processed for their crimes could cause an irreparable harm to victims, to the extreme that they might evade responsibility for the atrocities they committed,” wrote Vivanco in an El Tiempo column. Both Vivanco and Uprimny, writing in El Espectador, cited the experience of 14 paramilitary leaders whom then-president Álvaro Uribe extradited en masse in May 2008. “The paramilitaries’ extraditions have made it almost impossible to know the truth about their crimes,” wrote Uprimny. “For these same reasons, I think Santrich should not be extradited.”

For their part, the two candidates leading polling for the May 27 presidential elections have both said that they would extradite. Rightist Iván Duque, the candidate of Uribe’s party, has said he would sign the extradition order immediately. Leftist Gustavo Petro, said that the transitional justice system agreed by the peace accord (Special Peace Jurisdiction, or JEP) should first consider all the evidence against Santrich. “If the JEP confirms the acts were committed after the accords’ signing and I am president,” Petro tweeted, “Mr. Santrich will be extradited.” Petro’s position is similar to that of President Santos.

Setback to Land Grants for Demobilized FARC Members

The Colombian government and the FARC have been casting about to find a way to reintegrate guerrilla ex-combatants by giving them land to cultivate. This, surprisingly, was not foreseen in the peace accord. The Santos administration had been close to issuing a decree allowing titling of lands for former fighters’ cooperative agricultural projects. The decree has run into trouble, though, over objections from the country’s principal federation of landholders.

A year ago, while demobilizing FARC fighters were concentrated in 26 village-sized disarmament sites around the country, Colombia’s National University surveyed them to gather information about their backgrounds and needs, as foreseen by the peace accords. It found that 66 percent of the 10,015 former FARC surveyed were from rural areas and another 15 were from rural/urban areas, such as towns within overwhelmingly rural municipalities. Sixty percent said they wanted to carry out collective reintegration through agricultural activities.

After meeting with his “peace cabinet” on April 30, President Santos said that “within the FARC there is a conflict: the leaders want everything to be collective, while the base, many of them, want it to be individual. As a result of this conflict, the FARC haven’t approved the individual reincorporation route, and resources for 5,000 ex-combatants’ productive projects are blocked by that dispute.” FARC leader Pastor Alape, a member of the National Reincorporation Council set up by the peace accord, responded, “Reincorporation is being slowed bye the lack of a public policy… and fundamentally, because there isn’t any land for the productive projects” that ex-guerrillas wish to pursue.

The Santos government’s draft decree sought to address this by making possible the delivery of some lands to ex-combatants. It had identified 11 plots of land in 9 departments, totaling about 492 hectares, that could be granted. The Center for Peace Studies (CESPAZ), which worked with the Presidency in drafting the accord, estimates that the amount of land needed to guarantee guerrillas’ reintegration would be 37,657 hectares, an amount smaller than many Colombian cattle ranches and industrial farms.

Nonetheless, the decree has been put on hold after the Society of Colombian Agricultural Producers (SAC), a national association of mostly large landowners, criticized it. “At no point does the accord mention giving land to the former members of this terrorist group,” said SAC President Jorge Enrique Bedoya, “and the draft decree that the government submitted for citizens’ consideration is giving prevalence to this specific group over landless farmers.”

The above information comes largely from a May 7 report from the investigative website Verdad Abierta. The site later posted this addendum to the report:

After this article’s publication, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) communicated with VerdadAbierta.com to inform that the national government decided to resolve the need to adjudicate lands to ex-combatants through the promulgation of Decree 756 of May 4, 2018. The document contains one article, which opens the door for the National Land Agency (ANT) to adjudicate lands directly to “associations or to cooperative organizations.”
The text does not correspond to the draft decree described in this story, nor does it align with the terms that the government and FARC negotiated in the National Reincorporation Council (CNR) to guarantee economic reincorporation. With regard to that, the OACP source who communicated with this site responded that the executive branch made this unilateral decision in response to the received critiques.

Truth Commission Formally Launches

May 8 was the official first day of operation for the Truth Commission established by the FARC peace accord. As of that date, the eleven commissioners have three years and six months in which to produce a report about what happened in the armed conflict, to promote recognition of victims, and to help generate conditions for “a culture of respect and tolerance.”

President Santos swore in the commissioners, led by Commission President Father Francisco De Roux, before a room full of high court officials and government ministers. De Roux and his colleagues had been working to lay the groundwork for the commission’s functioning, thanks to a UNDP grant, since they were chosen in November.

Over those months, the Commission held 22 workshops with victims and human rights defenders, as well as dozens of meetings with other stakeholders. It will now establish teams to cover 10 regions from 26 different offices. They hope to finish their report well before the deadline in order to spend the rest of their period educating about its content and promoting social reconciliation.

El Espectador asked De Roux, a Jesuit priest with a long record of heading human rights efforts, “What was the most serious thing that happened” in the conflict? He replied,

Human dignity was profoundly damaged by this conflict. Society’s silences, and lack of reaction, against the barbarity that we were living through. We just saw all of Ecuador stirred up by three journalists [killed by a FARC dissident group near the border]. We saw barbarity after barbarity happen, without doing anything, which is evidence of a very deep humanitarian crisis. Not just for the people who died, but for the lack of understanding, as a society, that the death of an indigenous person or an Afro-Colombian is the death of all of us. It is the undermining of our value as human beings and Colombian citizens. That’s where the wound is deep.

JEP Excludes “Para-Politicians”

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional justice system set up by the peace accord to judge war crimes, rejected the applications of two politicians currently serving sentences for aiding paramilitary groups. Senator Álvaro Ashton and ex-senator David Char, the JEP’s “Chamber for Definition of Legal Situations” determined, did not commit crimes that could be considered “grave conduct related to the conflict.” As a result, they are not entitled to the maximum sentence of five to eight years of “restricted liberty” that the JEP would hand out in exchange for full confessions and reparations to victims.

Ashton and Char are among several dozen political figures who ended up before courts and in prison during the 2000s for aiding and abetting paramilitary groups that killed tens of thousands of Colombians. The scandal was known as “para-politics.” The JEP chamber’s decision, which can be appealed, reads, “The majority of members of Congress investigated and sentenced for conspiracy (the basic charge of ‘para-politics’) associated themselves with paramilitary structures neither to support them nor to win the war, but as a means to pursue their personal political interests.”

The chamber’s magistrates made clear that, in order to get a chance at a lighter penalty within the JEP, each crime’s relationship to the armed conflict must be clearly demonstrated. “It is not enough to say that something happened in the general context of violence,” El Espectador reported.

The JEP at some point will have to consider a petition from Jorge Luis Alfonso López, a para-politician who is the son of Enilse López, a Bolívar-based paramilitary sponsor named “La Gata” who has run the lottery gambling business in much of Colombia’s coast. Her son says “he has been directly and indirectly involved in the armed conflict” and wants to give information about politicians his family has financed, as well as military and police officers who worked with paramilitaries.

Universal Periodic Review in Geneva

It was Colombia’s turn this week for regular consideration of its human rights record before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Colombia’s Interior Minister, Foreign Minister, and some human rights defenders were on hand for a Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which occurs about every five years.

Representatives of 95 governments offered comments about Colombia’s human rights situation. Nearly all of them said something about the rising number of social leaders and human rights defenders being killed in the country. The last time Colombia was subject to UPR, in 2013, the country’s human rights ombudsman’s office (Defensoría) counted 35 such murders. Between 2016 and now, it has counted 261.

The U.S. representative’s message was helpful, expressing concern about low levels of accountability for these murders, and noting targeting of ethnic and labor leaders. Though recognizing that about half of these cases have seen some advance in investigations or prosecutions, the U.S. representative said that they needed to be brought fully to justice.

The Colombian government responded that many of the killings owe to criminal groups’ violent efforts to take control of territories so that they may dominate illegal businesses like drug trafficking, precious-metals mining, and extortion. Colombian officials told the Council that it was carrying out a protection plan, and that in some way this plan was covering 4,000 social leaders, 60 percent of them in rural areas.

Colombian human rights organizations presented a joint report in Geneva. While they praised the government for the FARC peace accord and for making commitments on human rights, they criticized its lack of follow-through. “The Colombian state ends up adopting the [human rights] norm, but later it doesn’t implement it, or doesn’t put up enough resources to put it into practice,” said Ana María Rodríguez of the Colombian Commission of Jurists. Organizations present noted that the Council’s deliberations paid little attention to the paramilitary phenomenon, the responsibility of some businesses for human rights abuses, and the violations of privacy committed by Colombian intelligence agencies.

Attacks on “Rios Vivos” Movement in Antioquia

Luis Alberto Torres was killed in rural Puerto Valdivia, Antioquia, while mining by a riverside on May 8. Just eight days earlier, in the same municipality, gunmen killed Hugo Albeiro George in a local shop. Both men were members of the “Ríos Vivos” movement, formed to protest HidroItuango, a massive hydroelectric dam project underway in northern Antioquia.

“We hope that, in response to these acts, the Antioquia Police do not focus on dismissing and ignoring the leadership and human rights and environmental defense work that all of us members of Rios Vivio carry out,” read a statement from the organization. “Instead, we expect decisive action.”

Meanwhile, the Hidroituango dam project is in crisis. Since April 28, one of the tunnels used to divert the Cauca river has been blocked, raising the river’s level and forcing families to evacuate.

Response to Killing of FARC Member in Arauca

Unknown assailants killed Juan Vicente Carvajal alias “Misael,” a former FARC leader in the conflictive department of Arauca, about 4 kilometers from the FARC demobilization site in the village of Filipinas, Arauquita. As of early April, 52 FARC members had been killed nationwide since 2017.

Carvajal was among FARC leaders whom the U.S. government wanted in extradition for past narcotrafficking, and he led a FARC column during a bloody 2008-2010 conflict that the FARC and ELN fought in Arauca. This makes the ELN, which remains dominant in much of rural Arauca, a prime suspect in the murder.

Carvajal had left the Filipinas demobilization site, and had used his own resources to start a farm and run a discotheque in Arauquita. The security forces stated that they did not believe he was involved in criminal activity. He was living at his farm when he was murdered.

In a missive to FARC members, the ex-guerrillas’ maximum leader, Rodrigo Londoño alias Timochenko, warned them about going off on their own, as Carvajal had. While the ex-guerrilla’s homicide was “truly alarming,” Londoño said that it doesn’t mean that all former combatants are “condemned to total extermination.” Leaving the other ex-combatants and living by himself put him “in a high risk situation. …Discipline was always necessary… for the war, and I don’t know why some think that they don’t need it during reincorporation.”

In-Depth Reading

The day ahead: May 15, 2018

I’m reachable, but replies may be delayed. (How to contact me)

I’m working at home, with a lot of writing to do. I’ll post another Colombia update, then work on a presentation I’ll be giving Friday about human rights issues in Colombia, and a paper that I’ll be presenting next week about the state of U.S. policy toward Colombia.

Some articles I found interesting this morning

Ariana Cubillos/AP photo at The Miami Herald. Caption: “In this April 18, 2018 photo, residents of La Chinita neighborhood hold a sign with a message that reads in Spanish: ’24 days without light, without answers,’ during a protest in Maracaibo, Venezuela. Blackouts are nothing new under two decades of socialist rule in Venezuela. But they’ve grown more frequent, and are lasting longer.”

(Even more here)

May 14, 2018

Brazil

Decisão do Itamaraty vem em resposta a uma carta do filho do jornalista Vladimir Herzog, morto pela ditadura durante o governo do general Ernesto Geisel

Central America Regional, Colombia

Although it is his first time commanding Marines, Del Rio’s career has been filled with prior experience with training and attending formal schools with Marines

Colombia

Hay noticias de presencia de las disidencias de las Farc en todos los países vecinos, a excepción de Panamá. El tráfico de drogas es el principal motivo, sumado a la presión militar

Para los campesinos, que crezca la maleza y se expanda es prueba fehaciente de los retrasos de esta iniciativa

Están en juego desde la suerte de la paz con las Farc hasta la posibilidad de una muerte trágica que convertiría a Santrich en un mártir

Guatemala

17 mil personas se han salvado de morir de manera violenta en los últimos ocho años como consecuencia del descenso en las cifras de homicidios registradas a partir de septiembre de 2009. El fenómeno, sin embargo, registra una preocupante desigualdad

Both groups have historically fought mining and hydroelectric projects that threaten their areas. They also fight for land rights and have accused powerful forces of pushing indigenous farmers off their lands

Mexico

Dos jueces federales, uno en Ciudad de México y otra en el estado de Guanajuato, concedieron amparos en contra de la Ley de Seguridad Interior al considerarla inconstitucional

Detrás de las cifras de muertos y desaparecidos en Chilapa, Guerrero, hay un drama, una tragedia alimentada por la complicidad de las autoridades

Nicaragua

Representante de la institución asume compromiso ante dirigentes del sector productivo de Nicaragua

El Gobierno accede a que organismo de la OEA venga al país a “observar la situación de los derechos humanos”

Venezuela

In a recent study by Meganalisis, a Venezuelan polling firm, 70 percent of people said they wouldn’t vote in Sunday’s race and 77 percent said they didn’t trust the National Electoral Council

Western Hemisphere Regional

Over the 16 fiscal years ended last September, CNN has identified at least 564 deaths of people crossing illegally in the border region, above and beyond the Border Patrol’s tally of 5,984

CBP and DOJ guidance also allow border patrol agents to profile under certain conditions—a remarkable fact given that 72 percent of the U.S. minority population lives in the 100-mile zone

Sessions has stepped into the immigration system in an unprecedented manner: giving himself and his office the ability to review, and rewrite, cases that could set precedents for a large share of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants with pending immigration court cases

The day ahead: May 14, 2018

I’ll be sort of reachable in the afternoon, but writing with the door closed. (How to contact me)

I’ve got a morning staff meeting, and an open afternoon, except for one or two calls with journalists.

I’ll have my head down at my desk. Today I hope to finish a final edit of a WOLA memo describing what would happen if the Trump administration actually tried to prosecute everyone caught at the border. I want to finish a presentation about Colombia human rights that I’ll be giving to a class Friday at the National Defense University’s Perry Center. And I want to be close to finishing a “last week in Colombia’s peace process” update.

So I’ll probably be hard to reach. This will happen all week, unfortunately, as the daily writing load will be similar.

The week ahead

I’m here in Washington all week. Next week I’ll be going to Barcelona for the annual Latin American Studies Association Conference. There, I’ll be presenting a paper about U.S. policy toward Colombia that is far from being finished. Later, we’ll turn that paper into a WOLA publication.

This is shaping up to be a week of intense writing, between 1,000-2,000 words a day plus research. In addition to the LASA paper, I have two memos to finish and a presentation for a class on human rights Friday at the National Defense University’s Perry Center. Plus a “last week in Colombia’s peace process” update. So, lots of coffee this week.

I’ll have to keep my meeting and phone schedule light, so I may be hard to contact all week.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington This Week

Monday, May 14

  • 2:30–4:00 at the Wilson Center: Mexican Presidential Candidate Series: A Conversation with Carlos Manuel Urzúa Macías (RSVP required).

Tuesday, May 15

Wednesday, May 16

Thursday, May 17

Friday, May 18

  • 10:00–11:30 at USIP: Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion (RSVP required).
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