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Last Updated:7/7/05
The 2006 aid request

Relevant text from the bills so far

In reverse chronological order: The Senate - The House - The Bush Administration's Request

The Senate

The full Senate is likely to debate the 2006 foreign aid bill (H.R. 3057) in mid to late July. Once it approves its version, a House-Senate conference committee will reconcile the differences between the two chambers' bills.

On June 30, 2005, the Senate Appropriations Committee met to "mark up" (agree upon a draft of) the Senate's version of the 2006 foreign aid bill (H.R. 3057), which had been marked up in subcommittee two days earlier.

Several of the Colombia provisions in the Senate's version of the bill differ significantly from those in the House's version.

Aid amounts

The Senate committee's bill fully funds the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) request for $734.5 million in military and economic aid for Colombia and six of its neighbors.

However, the bill language seeks a better balance between military and economic aid for Colombia. It puts a "ceiling" on the amount of ACI aid that can go to Colombia's military: "not more than $278,450,000 shall be made available for assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces and National Police." As indicated below, the Bush Administration's request for 2006 had anticipated providing $331,850,000 to the Colombian military and police through the ACI (when funds for "Airbridge Denial" are included), and it had provided $324.6 million in such aid through this account in 2004. If the Senate language passes, 2006 military and police aid to Colombia through the ACI account could total $53.4 million less than what the Bush Administration had requested.

It also raises the "floor" for economic aid, specifying that "not less than $149,757,000 shall be made available for alternative development/institution building in Colombia, which shall be apportioned directly to the United States Agency for International Development." A similar "floor" for USAID assistance to Colombia appeared in the 2005 foreign aid bill, which calls for a minimum of $125,700,000 through USAID for this year. (A smaller, additional amount of non-military assistance for "rule of law" programs does not go through USAID. The Bush Administration's 2006 aid request indicated a plan to spend $27,379,000 on rule of law programs in 2005, and $27,393,000 in 2006. If the Senate language passes, non-military aid to Colombia in 2006 could total $25 million more than the Bush Administration's request, rising to $177.15 million.)

The House version of the bill does not include any "ceiling" and "floor" language (despite an effort to add some, led by Rep. Sam Farr (D-California), that was thwarted in committee).

Conditions on aid for paramilitary (or guerrilla) demobilization and reintegration

The Senate bill contains strong and specific conditions on U.S. support for "demobilization of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)." No similar conditions appear in the House version.

Funds for such demobilizations may only pay for "limited activities," and only then after the State Department certifies that the following conditions have been met.

1. The Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy that inhibits extraditions of "members and former members" of Colombian terrorist organizations. (Several AUC paramilitary leaders currently face extradition requests for narcotrafficking.)

2. Colombia's "legal framework" for demobilizations "provides for effective investigation, prosecution and punishment, in proportion to the crimes committed, of gross violations of humanitarian law and drug trafficking."

3. Colombia's "legal framework" for demobilizations conditions sentence reductions "on a full and truthful confession" of each demobilizing individual's "involvement in criminal activity; full disclosure of his knowledge of the FTO's structure, financing sources, and illegal assets; and turnover of the totality of his illegal assets."

4. Colombia's "legal framework" for demobilizations requires that, in order to get reduced sentences, each demobilizing commander ceases "illegal activity by the troops under his command" and turns over all of his group's illegal assets.

5. Colombia's "legal framework" for demobilizations provides for revocation of sentence reductions if demobilizing individuals "are subsequently found to have withheld illegal assets, lied to the authorities about their criminal activities in the group, rejoined the same or another FTO, or engaged in new illegal activities."

6. "An inter-agency working group consisting of representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Departments of State and Defense has consulted with local and national Colombian law enforcement and military authorities, representatives from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, and representatives of Colombian civil society organizations, and has independently concluded in a detailed report submitted to the Committees on Appropriations," that:

a. The group that is demobilizing "is not violating any ceasefire and has ceased illegal activities, including narco-trafficking, extortion, and violations of international humanitarian law."

b. The group's "criminal and financial structure is being destroyed" and the group, "or any part thereof, is not regrouping to continue illegal activities."

c. The Colombian government "is conducting effective investigations and prosecutions" of the group's commanders for crimes, including human rights and international humanitarian law violations, "and, when appropriate, extraditing them to the United States."

d. The Colombian government "is aggressively implementing an effective procedure to locate and confiscate illegal assets, held directly or through third parties."

e. The Colombian government is enforcing ceasefires by barring ceasefire violators from receiving reduced sentences or other demobilization benefits.

Before issuing a certification that these conditions exist, the State Department must "consult with internationally recognized human rights organizations and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia."

Human rights certification

As in every year since 2003, twenty-five percent of the aid will be held up until the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian military is complying with several human rights standards. The Senate bill's conditions are identical to those in the House bill, with two exceptions. (1) The Senate language adds a sixth condition: the Secretary of State must certify that "the Colombian Armed Forces are respecting the legal, cultural, and territorial rights of Colombia's indigenous communities." (2) In addition to requiring consultation with relevant congressional committees and internationally recognized human-rights groups, the Senate bill would also require the State Department to consult with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia before certifying.

Other earmarks

The Senate bill would require a minimum of $8 million to be devoted to judicial-reform programs in Colombia. At least $10 million would go "to the United States Agency for International Development for organizations and programs to protect human rights." At least $2 million would "be made available through nongovernmental organizations for programs to protect biodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia." The House bill made no earmarks.

Fumigation certification

The Senate bill renews language, which has been in each bill since 2003, holding up all but 20 percent of funding for herbicides until the State Department certifies that aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly sprayed, and availability of alternative development. The fumigation conditions do not appear in the House bill.

The Foreign Relations / Foreign Assistance Authorization Bills (H.R. 2601 and S. 600)

The House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have both drafted bills reauthorizing - that is, making changes to the permanent law governing - several foreign aid programs.

Though these "authorization" bills rarely become law, they are worth keeping an eye on, and have some provisions relevant to Colombia.

The Senate's bill, reported out of committee on March 10, would extend through the "unified campaign" language allowing counter-drug aid to Colombia to be used for counter-terrorism.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's non-binding narrative report calls for a strong legal framework to be in place before U.S. funds be used to support paramilitary demobilizations in Colombia.

The committee notes its interest in supporting, through funding, a program to implement the demobilization of AUC paramilitary combatants, and that such a process be conducted pursuant to a comprehensive legal framework, as determined by Colombians through good faith negotiations with the Colombian Congress. If the United States is to fund a significant share of the demobilization program, however, it should meet certain minimal standards. The committee believes it imperative that any demobilization program bring about the full dismantlement of the underlying structure, illegal sources of financing, and economic power of the AUC, which have been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In this regard, the committee believes it is crucial that each paramilitary seeking sentence reductions or other benefits from demobilization be required to forfeit illegally acquired assets, confess past crimes, and fully disclose any knowledge of the operative structure, financing sources, and the criminal activities of the FTO and its individual members. Each demobilized AUC member's benefits should be fully revocable if judicial authorities find that he has failed to fulfill these requirements.

The committee believes it is critical that the groups of AUC leaders who receive sentence reductions or other benefits fully demobilize and comply with the cease-fire. The committee also believes that all perpetrators of atrocities must serve a minimum number of years in prison for their crimes. The committee urges the Government of Colombia to put in place effective mechanisms to monitor demobilized individuals to prevent them from continuing to engage in organized criminal activity. Finally, the committee urges the Government of Colombia to devise a legal framework that can be equally applicable to other FTOs in Colombia, such as the FARC.

The House bill was "marked up" (drafted) by the full House International Relations Committee on June 9, 2005. As of June 27, the text of this bill has not been made public.

The bill does contain an amendment introduced by Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana) restricting aid for the paramilitary process until the Secretary of State assures that (1) aid is only going to those who have renounced membership in the AUC; (2) the Colombian government is "cooperating" in the extradition of paramilitaries wanted for drug-trafficking, and (3) the "framework law" governing the demobilizations is able to dismantle the groups while "balancing both the need for reconciliation as well as the need for justice." The amendment passed despite opposition from the committee's ranking Democrat, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-California), who considered the language to be too vague to stop U.S. aid from going to a flawed process.

Rep. Barbara Lee (D-California) introduced an amendment that sought to ensure that 40 percent of funds in the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account went to "The promotion of sustainable economic development and the strengthening of civilian government in rural areas of Colombia, and The protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic institutions in Colombia." The amendment failed on a party-line vote of 20 Democrats for, to 22 Republicans against.

Fumigation in national parks

The Senate bill specifies that "funds appropriated by this Act may be used for aerial fumigation in Colombia's national parks or reserves only if the Secretary of State determines that it is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternatives to reduce drug cultivation in these areas." No such language appears in the House bill.

Bolivia conditions

The Senate bill renews language, which first appeared in the 2004 bill, estabilishing human rights conditions on military aid to Bolivia. Before this aid can be delivered, the Secretary of State must certify "that the Bolivian military is respecting human rights, and civilian judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, with the military's cooperation, military personnel who have been implicated in gross violations of human rights."

ACI provisions that appear in both the House and Senate bills

The House and Senate include identical language expanding the mission of all past and present counter-drug aid, allowing it to be used in a “unified campaign” against both drugs and the activities of the FARC, ELN and AUC. Identical language specifies that "no United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available by this Act for Colombia." Both versions call for a "report on the proposed uses of all funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed program, project, or activity" before aid can be delivered.

Report language

The Senate Appropriations Committee's non-binding narrative report includes several interesting provisions with regard to Colombia:

Fumigation:

"The Committee is increasingly concerned ... that the aerial eradication program is falling far short of predictions and that coca cultivation is shifting to new locations. Since the start of Plan Colombia, over 525,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed, yet coca cultivation has decreased by only 7 percent. Last year alone, 136,555 hectares were sprayed, but the total area under cultivation, estimated by the State Department at 114,000 hectares, remained essentially unchanged from the previous year. There is no indication that the quantity of cocaine entering the United States has decreased."

The Committee directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the EPA and appropriate Colombian authorities, to submit a report not later than 180 days after enactment of the Act, with the following information: the results of a GIS analysis of the proximity of small, shallow water bodies to coca and poppy fields and of tests to determine the toxicity of the spray mixture to Colombian amphibians; and, an assessment of potential impacts of the spray program on threatened species, including in Colombia's national parks.

Afro-Colombians:

"The Committee is aware that Afro-Colombians face many difficult problems, including poverty and discrimination. The Committee recommends assistance to address the economic and social needs of Afro-Colombians, particularly IDPs in the Choco region, through the Afro-Latino Development Alliance."

The House of Representatives

On June 28, 2005, the full House of Representatives debated the Foreign Operations appropriations bill for 2006 (H.R. 3057). Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts), Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota) and Dennis Moore (D-Kansas) introduced an amendment seeking to cut $100 million in military assistance from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 189 in favor to 234 against.

On June 21, 2005, the full House Appropriations Committee met to "mark up" (agree upon a draft of) the House's version of the 2006 foreign aid bill (H.R. 3057).

The committee made no changes to the Colombia language. However, Rep. Sam Farr (D-California) introduced an amendment seeking to earmark a minimum amount of Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) funds for USAID programs in Colombia. The language of Rep. Farr's amendment was similar to economic-aid minimums that have appeared in the past few years' bills, at the Senate's initiative. The amount sought would have been $20 million higher than 2005 levels, which would have likely required a similar-sized cut in military aid programs. After some debate, Rep. Farr withdrew the amendment before it came to a vote.

The committee's non-binding narrative report includes several interesting provisions with regard to the ACI:

  • Opposition to an aid cut for Peru: "The Committee rejects the Administration's requested 16 percent reduction for eradication, interdiction and alternative development programs in Peru and expects last year's level of funding to be provided through reductions in the air bridge denial program and the new air assets program for Colombia and Bolivia."
  • Improved ACI reporting: "The Committee requests that the Secretary of State submit to the Appropriations Committees a semi-annual report with respect to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. Each report shall include an accounting of all aircraft, vehicles, boats and lethal equipment (other than ammunition) transferred to the militaries or police of any nation with funds made available under this heading. Additionally, the Committee requires that the personnel cap and Plan Colombia reports as required in the fiscal year 2000 emergency supplemental also be submitted to the Committees on Appropriations."
  • Call for a long-term strategy in the absence of a "Plan Colombia 2": "The Committee notes that Plan Colombia was proposed and implemented as a 6-year program, to be complete by the end of 2005, yet the Committee has not been consulted by the Administration on its follow-up program to Plan Colombia. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of USAID, to report to the Committee no later than 60 days after enactment of this Act on the future, multi-year strategy of the United States assistance program to Colombia. The Committee expects this strategy to include all aspects of current and future United States assistance and detailed explanations for how the Colombian government will assume responsibility for maintaining more of Plan Colombia's assets."
  • Transfer of responsibilities for aircraft and fuel costs: "The Committee is concerned about the many levels of bureaucratic approval needed before the State Department's air assets can be used for program support or rescue operations, which is hindering efficient operations and possibly endangering human welfare. Additionally, the Committee has held the longstanding view that the Colombian Government immediately should begin the process of assuming the operational and maintenance functions of Plan Colombia's assets. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of State to report back to the Committee no later than 60 days after the enactment of this Act, what actions are being taken by the Departments of State and Defense to transfer responsibilities for programs funded in this Act currently being executed by United States contractors to Colombian nationals."

    The Committee notes the increased cost of oil and fuel as a leading factor in higher operating costs of the Colombian counternarcotics program. The Committee also notes that Colombia is a net exporter of oil with revenues from oil approaching $4,500,000,000 annually. Given that United States foreign assistance is being used to safeguard the Colombian oil supplies and pipelines, including $17,300,000 in fiscal year 2006 to operate air assets protecting the Arauca pipeline, the Committee expects the Government of Colombia to offset some of these increased costs given the increased revenues the Government of Colombia has collected as the price of oil has risen. The Committee directs the Secretary of State to report back to the Committee no later than 90 days after enactment of this Act on levels of revenue the Government of Colombia is devoting to offsetting the increased fuel prices borne by the United States as a result of Plan Colombia.
  • Paramilitary demobilizations: "The Committee notes that there are no funds in the fiscal year 2006 budget request for demobilization of paramilitaries. The Committee has retained language requiring consultation and notification before the obligation of funds for this purpose."
  • Alternative development and eradication: "The Committee strongly supports USAID's continuing alternative development strategy that focuses on the historic underdevelopment of Colombia's outlying regions. The programs concentrate on local infrastructure needs (roads, electricity, water) and delivery of services at the community level. This focus on an entire community increases the social pressure for eradication and also helps organize the community to identify and prioritize local needs. It is the Committee's view that alternative development integrated with the presence of the state and the presence of law enforcement and security are fundamentally the key to long term peace and security in Colombia.
    The Committee directs USAID to report back to the Committee no later than 60 days after enactment of this Act what detailed steps the Government of Colombia is taking to develop a comprehensive rural development strategy.
    The Committee has not recommended funding for a new, fourth eradication team for Colombia because the President did not request this funding in fiscal year 2006 and due to the Committee's restrictive budgetary allocation relative to the President's request. The Committee notes that this recommendation is made without prejudice and is solely a result of pressures to fund other Presidential priorities."

On June 14, 2005, the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee met to "mark up" (agree upon a draft of) the House's version of the 2006 foreign aid bill (H.R. 3057).

The House version of the bill provides the Bush Administration's full request of $734.5 million for the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).” Administered by the State Department’s international narcotics bureau, the ACI provides counter-drug military and economic aid for Colombia and six of its neighbors (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela; Guatemala and Nicaragua received some ACI aid in 2005 but are not expected to do so in 2006).

The House language makes no earmarks specifying that a minimum amount go to economic aid programs administered by USAID. During the past few years, such earmarking language has appeared in the Senate's version of the bill and been adopted, with modifications, by the Conference Committee that resolves differences between both houses' versions of the bill.

Expanded authority

The bill continues language that first appeared in the 2002 emergency anti-terror supplemental appropriation bill. For the duration of fiscal year 2005, the bill expands the mission of all past and present counter-drug aid, allowing it to be used in a “unified campaign” against both drugs and the activities of the FARC, ELN and AUC – in other words, allowing aid from counter-drug funding accounts to be used for counter-insurgent (or “counter-terror”) operations.

As in every year since 2003, this expanded mission is contingent on the Colombian military’s execution of “vigorous operations” to retake territory from paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and to respect human rights. As in past years, U.S.-donated helicopters must be returned if the State Department finds that Colombian forces used them to aid or abet paramilitary groups.

Funding paramilitary demobilizations

The bill language requires that any funding for demobilization and reintegration of armed-group members "be subject to prior consultation with, and the regular notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations."

Avoidance of combat

The bill language specifies that "no United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available by this Act for Colombia."

Human rights conditions

As in every year since 2003, twenty-five percent of the aid will be held up until the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian military is complying with several human rights standards. The language, which is unchanged, is as follows:

(A) The Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is suspending from the Armed Forces those members, of whatever rank who, according to the Minister of Defense or the Procuraduria General de la Nacion, have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations.

(B) The Colombian Government is vigorously investigating and prosecuting those members of the Colombian Armed Forces, of whatever rank, who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations, and is promptly punishing those members of the Colombian Armed Forces found to have committed such violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations.

(C) The Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases (including providing requested information, such as the identity of persons suspended from the Armed Forces and the nature and cause of the suspension, and access to witnesses, relevant military documents, and other requested information).

(D) The Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in severing links (including denying access to military intelligence, vehicles, and other equipment or supplies, and ceasing other forms of active or tacit cooperation) at the command, battalion, and brigade levels, with paramilitary organizations, especially in regions where these organizations have a significant presence.

(E) The Colombian Government is dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers, especially in regions where these networks have a significant presence.

This section requires the State Department to consult with internationally recognized human-rights organizations on Colombia every 90 days.

Fumigation conditions

The House bill does not include language, which has been in each bill since 2003, holding up funding for herbicides until the State Department certifies that aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly sprayed, and availability of alternative development.

Peru and Bolivia

The House bill does not prohibit U.S. funding, which has appeared every year since 2003, for a renewed Peruvian air interdiction program until 30 days after the State Department and CIA certify that “enhanced safeguards and procedures” are in place.

The House bill does not include human rights conditions on ACI aid to Bolivia, which first appeared in 2004.

Report

No “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” funds can be spent until the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development give Congress a report on the proposed uses of all funds “on a country-by-country basis for each proposed program, project, or activity.” This report was due within 45 days of the bill’s final passage.

The Bush Administration's request

On February 15, 2005, the Bush administration submitted to Congress its foreign aid budget request for 2006. It called for an amount of aid to Colombia about the same as 2004 and 2005 levels: $579.6 million. Of that amount, $427.5 million would go to Colombia's military and police, with the remaining $152.2 million going to economic and social assistance programs.

Foreign operations accounts for most - but not all - of the aid that Colombia gets. The Defense budget appropriation provides additional counter-drug aid military and police aid, but the Defense Department is not required to estimate how much aid each country is to receive. In 2004, however, Colombia's military and police received an estimated $122 million in additional military and police aid through the U.S. defense budget, and the Congressional Research Service estimates a figure as high as $200 million for 2005. If Defense Department aid is an average of those two figures - $161 million - in 2006, Colombia will get $590.5 million in military-police aid next year (80%), compared to $152.2 million in economic-social aid.

Program
Military / Police Aid
Economic / Social Aid
Total
International Narcotics Control (INC - Andean Regional Initiative)
$331,850,000
$152,150,000
$484,000,000
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
$90,000,000
-
$90,000,000
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
$1,700,000
-
$1,700,000
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
$3,900,000
-
$3,900,000
Foreign Operations Budget Request Total
$427,450,000
$152,150,000
$597,600,000
Excess Defense Articles (EDA), estimated by averaging 2003-2004 levels
$1,700,000
-
$1,700,000
Defense-Budget Counternarcotics Aid (Known as "Section 1004" and "Section 1033"), estimated by averaging 2004-2005 levels
$161,000,000
-
$161,000,000
Estimated Overall 2004 Total
$590,150,000
$152,150,000
$760,320,000
Foreign Military Financing

The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program -- used in recent years mostly to provide grant military aid to the Middle East and Eastern Europe -- would provide Colombia with $90 million in 2006. This money continues the effort to help Colombia's army protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline, which runs from Arauca department to Sucre department in northeastern Colombia. Much oil in this pipeline belongs to Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum.

FMF has moved well beyond the pipeline program, however. It now encompasses the "Plan Patriota" military offensive and several other efforts, as the State Department's 2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations describes.

FY 2006 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds will be used to continue our support to Colombia's national security strategy to extend central government authority and governance to areas heretofore prey to terrorists and narcotics traffickers. …

Colombian security forces will still require significant U.S. assistance for counternarcotics and counterterrorism, especially in key areas of mobility, intelligence, sustainment and training due to the increased operational pace brought about by President Uribe's successes. FY 2006 FMF will support Colombia's integrated national strategy with significant military assistance and counternarcotics programs that increase the Colombian military's ability to establish a secure environment, essential to President Uribe's comprehensive national security strategy.

The United States will provide operational support (training, supplies, repair parts, maintenance and infrastructure) and specialized equipment, including weapons, night vision goggles and communications, to the Army. Our 2006 request continues to support for the battlefield evacuation program and the army's specialized and mobile units, but also provides assistance (at lower levels) to the army's regular brigades and other units. The specialized units will be at the heart of Plan Patriota and the regular units will be called upon to consolidate the gains made be the more mobile units. The 2006 request also places greater emphasis on improving the logistics and training base of the Colombian armed forces. Improving the training, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure will be critical to ensuring the long-term success our assistance. The 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, trained in 2003 to provide protection to the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline, a key element of Colombia's economic infrastructure, will receive additional munitions, equipment and training to sustain this high profile and important mission. Support will also include establishing a national training center and developing an automated logistical system.

FMF will also support the Colombian Navy and Air Force and include the provision of interdiction boats, additional combat aircraft, training and infrastructure improvements, maintenance and operational support for Colombia's C-130 transportation fleet and helicopter support, improving the ability of the entire Colombian military to quickly provide forces for operations throughout the country. Our FY 2006 request will also continue support to improve the capacity of the Colombian armed forces to treat and evacuate wounded from the battlefield. FMF funds will be used for naval interdiction programs by providing secure communications equipment, spare parts, and assistance to establish an operations center. Riverine forces will benefit from spare parts and other logistical support.

The Andean Counter-Drug Initiative request

The aid request would provide Colombia and its neighbors with an additional $734.5 million in International Narcotics Control (INC) assistance, both military/police and economic.

    Country
    Military / Police
    Economic / Social
    Total
    Colombia
    $331,850,000
    $152,150,000
    $484,000,000
    Peru
    $54,000,000
    $43,000,000
    $97,000,000
    Bolivia
    $43,000,000
    $37,000,000
    $80,000,000
    Ecuador
    $8,460,000
    $11,540,000
    $20,000,000
    Brazil
    $6,000,000
    -
    $6,000,000
    Venezuela
    $3,000,000
    -
    $3,000,000
    Panama
    $4,500,000
    -
    $4,500,000
    "Critical Flight Safety Program"
    (for State Department-owned aircraft)
    $40,000,000
    Total
    $450,800,000
    $243,690,000
    $734,500,000
According to the Foreign Operations aid request, ACI funding for Colombia will focus mainly on supporting aerial spraying, maintaining a large number of planes and helicopters, and carrying out alternative development and other "economic and social" aid programs. The aid request explains:

In FY 2006, the program will continue moving towards a "maintenance spraying" phase that will strive to keep illicit crop production from reemerging - a step that is likely to involve as many, if not more flight hours as drug plantations become smaller and more dispersed. CNP and COLAR units trained and equipped in previous years will receive follow on training to cement professionalization, decrease corruption, foment respect for human rights, and improve operational effectiveness. In FY 2006, we will also see an increase in missions, area of operations, and number of vetted units receiving U.S. support due to the increased operational pace. Funds will also support infrastructure improvements, CNP training, and establishment of secure and interoperable communications and intelligence systems needed to keep pace with recent success and increased operational pace against the narcoterrorists.

In addition to air assets committed to spray operations, funds will support 82 crucial COLAR helicopters (maintenance and repair, training and operations, and fuel) throughout Colombian territory. Additional military equipment, including maintenance and operations of facilities and general operational support, will be provided to the Counterdrug Brigade with the eventual goal of having the GOC perform and fund the majority of maintenance, once the operational pace has leveled off.

Continued funding for alternative development and institutional building will be directed towards long-term projects. These projects are aimed at creating sustainable changes in the culture and economy, and so by design remain essentially stable over many years to allow the new patterns of thought and behavior to become entrenched.
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