Adam Isacson

Still trying to understand Latin America, my own country, and why so few consequences are intended. These views are not necessarily my employer’s.

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March 2023

Latin America-related events in Washington and online this week

Monday, March 27, 2023

  • 5:00-6:30 at Georgetown University: The García Luna Case: Dirty Money and the War on Drugs (RSVP required).

Tuesday, March 28, 2023

Wednesday, March 29, 2023

Thursday, March 30, 2023

  • 9:30 at the Atlantic Council and online: 2023: A pivotal moment to celebrate 200 years of US-Chile relations (RSVP required).
  • 3:00-5:00 at Georgetown University: Forty years after the US invasion of Grenada: lessons for the 21st Century (RSVP required).

Friday, March 31, 2023

  • 10:00 at Global Americans Zoom: The Implications of Climate Change for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in the Caribbean (RSVP required).

Of course they should stay

“Two Cuban migrants landed at Key West International Airport on a motorized hang glider Saturday morning,” ABC News reported.

Caption at abcnews.go.com: “Two Cuban migrants were taken into U.S. Border Patrol custody after landing at the Key West International Airport onboard a powered hang glider, Mar. 25, 2023. Monroe County Sheriff’s Office”

Anybody who can manage to assemble a motorized hang glider—despite Cuba’s constant scarcities and intelligence authorities’ ever-watchful eye—then fly it across the Florida Straits and land flawlessly at Key West’s airstrip…

Anybody who can do that has some serious grit, ingenuity, and initiative. Not only should their petition to remain here be honored, they should be able to start contributing to the U.S. economy as soon as possible. Anybody with the ability to do this is likely to create a lot of jobs for U.S. citizens.

Podcast: Cartels on the terrorist list? Military intervention in Mexico?

I just sat and recorded an episode of the solo podcast that I created when I started this website six years ago. Apparently, this is the first episode I’ve recorded since July 2017.

There’s no good reason for that: it doesn’t take very long to do. (Perhaps it should—this recording is very unpolished.) But this is a good way to get thoughts together without having to crank out something essay-length.

This episode is a response to recent calls to add Mexican organized crime groups to the U.S. terrorist list, and to start carrying out U.S. military operations against these groups on Mexican soil.

As I say in the recording, both are dumb ideas that won’t make much difference and could be counter-productive. Confronting organized crime with the tools of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency won’t eradicate organized crime. It may ensnare a lot of American drug dealers and bankers as “material supporters of terrorism,” and it may cause criminal groups to fragment and change names. But the territories were organized crime currently operates will remain territories where organized crime still operates.

Neither proposal gets at the problem of impunity for state collusion with organized crime. Unlike “terrorist” groups or insurgencies, Latin America’s organized crime groups thrive because of their corrupt links to people inside government, and inside security forces. As long as these links persist, “get-tough” efforts like the terrorist list or military strikes will have only marginal impact.

You can download the podcast episode here. The podcast’s page is here and the whole feed is here.

The Job of the Online Troll and Propagandist

It often happens on social media: you point out the devastating human cost of a policy that’s popular in some quarters. The response—whether from a troll army or from a leading propagandist—comes fast.

When that happens, remember: the responders aren’t talking to you. They’re not trying to convince you of anything.

The audience is readers on their own side. More specifically, any readers on their side who might feel a pang of conscience. Thousands of innocent people locked away? Small children expelled to countries where they’ll be vulnerable orphans? The steady advance of de-democratization?

That sort of thing, when you point it out, may make at least some of these policies’ and leaders’ supporters feel queasy. Your message may plant a seed of doubt with some of them.

The job of the troll and the propagandist is to dig up that seed and destroy it. To find a rationalization, however false, that eases the pain bubbling up in some followers’ conscience. Making the voice of doubt appear ridiculous, so that everyone on “their side” stays in line.

The job of the troll and the propagandist is not to debate you. You are not the audience. So don’t bother engaging them.

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: March 24, 2023

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

This week:

  • As the Department of Homeland Security announced a new initiative against cross-border fentanyl trafficking, the synthetic opioid appears now to be transiting more through Arizona than through California. Mexico’s production of the drug has become a thorny issue in the bilateral relationship.
  • Asylum seekers used the CBP One smartphone app 742 times per day in February to secure appointments at ports of entry, only a fraction of demand. Issues with the app remain so widespread that humanitarian workers in Mexican border cities are spending much of their time offering “tech support.”
  • A rally, with strong words from one of San Diego’s congressional representatives, rejected CBP’s plans to build taller segments of border wall through “Friendship Park,” the only federally sanctioned place where friends and relatives on both sides of the fence can meet in person.

Cross-border fentanyl trafficking shifting from California to Arizona

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas visited the Mariposa port of entry in Nogales, Arizona on March 21 to commemorate the launch of “Operation Blue Lotus,” a “surge operation” targeting cross-border fentanyl smuggling, which is now increasingly happening in Arizona.

With an increase in targeted inspections and recent installation of a “multi-energy portal (non-intrusive inspection technology or NII)” scanner at the Mariposa port, Mayorkas said that the operation had led to 18 drug seizures during its first week (March 13-19), including “over 900 pounds of fentanyl, over 700 pounds of methamphetamines, and over 100 pounds of cocaine.” The “portal” is the first of two that DHS expects to install at the Nogales border crossing.

The 900 pounds of fentanyl seized in a week is equal to about 19 days’ worth of CBP’s Arizona seizures in February, when the agency confiscated 1,300 pounds of the potent opioid.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement administration considers 2 milligrams of fentanyl to be a “potentially lethal dose;” if the 900 pounds seized were one-half pure, then they would be about 100 million such doses. That traffickers ( reportedly dominated by Mexico’s Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels) are willing to risk losing so much product indicates how cheap fentanyl is to produce, and how compact and easy to smuggle it is.

Since October 2022 (the start of the government’s 2023 fiscal year, which is on pace to break past years’ records), 92 percent of U.S. border authorities’ fentanyl seizures have occurred at ports of entry, the official border crossings. The remaining 8 percent was seized by Border Patrol agents between the ports of entry.

Breaking down this seizure data by month and sector shows a significant shift, starting in the summer and fall of 2022. San Diego (blue and brown on the below chart) had long made up the overwhelming majority of border fentanyl seizures. Rather suddenly, Arizona (green, plus the small red bits) is now where more than half of the drug appears to be crossing.

Mexico’s president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, caused a stir over the past two weeks by repeatedly claiming, without evidence, that Mexico does not produce fentanyl. His own presidential security briefings, most recently on March 7, along with military press releases, document large-scale seizures of the drug. While López Obrador sought to clarify that Mexican organized crime only has pill presses and does not manufacture the drug itself, the Wall Street Journal was able to visit a fentanyl lab in Sinaloa in 2022.

CBP One’s bumpy adoption continues

The Biden administration’s most recent court filing (dated March 16), the result of a Republican states-led lawsuit to preserve Title 42, includes statistics about asylum-seeking migrants who were able to secure appointments at border ports of entry using the “CBP One” smartphone app in February.

20,778 asylum seekers, 742 per day, were able to secure appointments under a system of Title 42 exemptions. That is up from 706 per day in January (21,881 total), when DHS switched—on January 18—from a less-formal Title 42 exemptions system to full use of the CBP One app.

As noted in several past Border Updates, migrants seeking appointments continue to experience problems with the app, including lack of internet access while fleeing, frequent crashes, limited languages (error messages are in English), and a facial capture feature that is widely reported as not responding to people with darker skin. The largest issue, though, continues to be the small number of daily appointments available, a fraction of current levels of protection-seeking migration.

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Latin America-related events in Washington and online this week

Monday, March 20, 2023

  • 11:00 at the Atlantic Council and online: Weathering the storms together: Improving US humanitarian efforts (RSVP required).
  • 1:00-5:00 at the Wilson Center and online: Forum on Cyber-Harassment (RSVP required).
  • 4:00-5:30 at wilsoncenter.org: The Ends of Modernization: Nicaragua and the United States in the Cold War Era (RSVP required).

Tuesday, March 21, 2023

Wednesday, March 22, 2023

Thursday, March 23, 2023

Friday, March 24, 2023

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: March 17, 2023

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

This week:

  • U.S. data from February point to a sustained reduction in recorded levels of migration since January. This is likely a short-term result of the Biden administration’s expanded use of the Title 42 pandemic authority, which has put asylum out of reach for more nationalities of migrants. Migration from Cuba and Nicaragua plummeted 99+ percent from December to February.
  • The Biden administration’s 2024 budget request would fund small increases in Border Patrol agents, CBP officers, and processing coordinators, along with scanning equipment for ports of entry, a border “contingency fund,” and more immigration judges. One budget document notes a 2022 jump in the number of what Border Patrol calls “got-aways”: migrants who evaded apprehension.
  • Several hundred mostly Venezuelan migrants stranded in Ciudad Juárez, motivated by a false rumor, massed at a border bridge, leading CBP to close the route to El Paso for five hours. The episode underlined the desperation of migrants marooned in the Mexican border city and unable to secure asylum appointments via CBP’s smartphone app.

February migration remains near lowest levels of the Biden administration

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published data on March 15 showing that, after declining 40 percent from December to January, the number of migrants whom U.S. authorities encountered at the U.S.-Mexico border remained similar in February. (See WOLA’s February 17 Border Update for a discussion of the January decline.)

Border Patrol encountered 128,877 undocumented migrants in border zones between ports of entry in February, almost identical to the 128,913 migrants the agency encountered in January (a month that, of course, is 3 days longer). Another 26,121 undocumented migrants came to land-border ports of entry, most of them with appointments to seek asylum, adding up to a border-wide total of 154,998 migrants.

Of that total, 39,206—25 percent—were what U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) calls “repeat encounters”: individuals whom the agency or its Border Patrol component had encountered at least once in the past 12 months. The agency actually encountered 94,124 unique individuals in February, a 13 percent drop from January.

The drop made February 2023 the second-lightest month of migration since the Biden administration’s first full month, February 2021. In El Paso, CBS News reported, shelters are “no longer severely overcrowded.”

The likely reason for the lower numbers continues to be the near-impossibility of gaining access to asylum for citizens of Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. All of these eight countries’ citizens are subject to rapid expulsion back into Mexico—whose government accepts them—using the Title 42 pandemic authority.

That authority, which will be three years old on March 20, is set to expire on May 11. The Biden administration convinced Mexico to add Venezuelan citizens to the list of “expellable” nationalities in October 2022; Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua were added in early January 2023. The difficulty of accessing asylum appears to have discouraged numerous asylum seekers, regardless of the threats they may be fleeing.

CBP applied Title 42 to migrants 72,591 times in February, the most since October 2022. That means 47 percent of migrant encounters ended in expulsions, the largest percentage since March 2022. Since its inception in March 2020, CBP has used Title 42 to expel migrants from the U.S.-Mexico border 2,687,315 times.

Between the ports of entry where Border Patrol operates, migration plummeted from the four countries most recently subject to Title 42 expulsion into Mexico (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). Border Patrol encounters with citizens of Cuba fell 99.6 percent from December to February, from 42,616 to 176 (although maritime encounters saw a dramatic increase, as discussed below). Encounters with Nicaraguan citizens dropped 99 percent from December (35,361 to 402).

Venezuelan and Haitian citizens have arrived in increasing numbers at ports of entry, where most presumably have secured appointments to seek asylum. Since January 18, they have sought to do so using a feature in CBP’s smartphone app, CBP One.

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Latin America-related events in Washington and online this week

Monday, March 13, 2023

Wednesday, March 15, 2023

Thursday, March 16, 2023

  • 9:15-10:30 at the Inter-American Dialogue and online: A Conversation with Dante Mossi, Executive President of CABEI (RSVP required).
  • 5:00-6:00 at Witness at the Border online: Biden’s Proposed Asylum Ban: a Disaster for Children and Families (RSVP required).

U.S.-Mexico Border Update: March 10, 2023

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

This week:

  • The Biden administration is considering a new measure to harden the border against asylum seekers: a revival of family detention facilities, which the administration shuttered last year.
  • Four U.S. citizens were kidnapped, and two killed, in the Mexican border city of Matamoros. The tragedy highlighted crisis-level security conditions in Mexico’s state of Tamaulipas, a frequent site of U.S. deportations and expulsions of migrants.
  • The Matamoros incident fed calls in Washington to add Mexican criminal organizations to the U.S. “terrorist list,” or even to intervene militarily. Neither proposal is likely either to be enacted, or to yield lasting results against organized crime or illicit drug supplies.

Biden Administration considering reviving family detention

The New York Times revealed on March 6 that the Biden administration is once again considering reviving a mechanism to harden the border against asylum seekers. Five “current and former administration officials with knowledge” of internal discussions said that “the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] is outlining what it would need to do to restart temporary family detention by May 11,” the day that the Title 42 pandemic expulsion policy is slated to end.

Apart from 2 pre-existing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) family detention centers, the Obama administration opened three facilities, later closing one,  to detain asylum-seekers who arrived as families (parents with children). The Trump administration maintained the two large facilities in Texas. Families spent up to 20 days at the Dilley and Karnes centers, a maximum set by a federal judge overseeing the Flores settlement agreement, which mandates that migrant children be kept in the “least restrictive setting available.”

While in detention, families—under a procedure called expedited removal—underwent preliminary “credible fear” interviews with asylum officers to determine the validity of their protection claims. In the vast majority of cases, these interviews occurred without counsel present, as detention made access to attorneys difficult.

By 2019, the Trump administration was paying nearly $320 per family bed per night to detain up to 2,500 family members at a time at Dilley and Karnes. (Because of family configurations, ICE said, the actual number was usually closer to 1,500.) This was—and remains—a tiny percentage of the total family migrant population. Those not selected for detention were generally released into the U.S. interior, usually with devices or other methods of monitoring them, with dates to appear in immigration court.

The family facilities were harmful and controversial. One, in Artesia, New Mexico, was closed in 2014 “after complaints about the conditions there,” the Times recalled. In 2018 two experts contracted by the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties blew the whistle on detention conditions that they described as posing “substantial harm to children.” (Drs. Scott Allen and Pamela McPherson, now represented by the Government Accountability Project, issued a March 8 statement opposing renewed family detention.)

During the 2020 campaign, Joe Biden tweeted, “Children should be released from ICE detention with their parents immediately. This is pretty simple, and I can’t believe I have to say it: Families belong together.” A February 2022 memo ordered that the Dilley and Karnes facilities be reconfigured to hold only adults.

Numbers of migrants arriving as families have averaged about 52,000 per month during Biden’s presidential tenure. As his administration prepares for a likely end of Title 42, a reversal of the President’s past positions is a distinct possibility.

Asked about it by PBS’s Christiane Amanpour, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas replied, “One thing that I promote in this department is to put all options on the table. Great, good, bad, terrible, let us discuss them, and many will be left on the cutting room floor… We haven’t made a decision yet.” White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre answered a reporter’s question: “I’m not saying it’s being considered… I’m not saying it is, and I’m not saying it is not. I’m saying that I’m not going to speak to rumors.”

“One leading option under consideration,” the Washington Post reported, would be to reopen the larger Dilley facility, though another Post source disputed that Dilley was being considered. “The facilities also would need to be set up to provide educational programs and playgrounds,” the New York Times noted.

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The 2024 foreign aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean

Today the White House released its 2024 budget request to Congress, including some preliminary information about U.S. foreign assistance programs. The State Department’s foreign aid overview points to almost exactly $3 billion in aid requested for next year in Latin America and the Caribbean, which would be about 9 percent more than in 2022.

I took the Latin America-specific items out of the administration’s PDF and present them in a Google Sheet with two tabs, one sorted by country and one sorted by program.


View in new window

This isn’t quite all of U.S. aid. The budget request mentions some global aid programs (probably including some refugee aid) that also channel resources to the Western Hemisphere, without specifying how much individual regions and countries are getting. So that would be additional. In addition, probably 200 or 300 million dollars in assistance goes to the region’s security forces through the Defense budget, and that’s neither reported well nor reflected here.

So the real 2024 total for Latin America could be closer to $4 billion. At first glance I don’t see any dramatic changes in the proposed assistance, which has followed the same general outlines since Barack Obama’s second term.

From WOLA: CBP and Border Patrol Deadly Force Incidents Since 2020

In my work on border security at WOLA, I maintain a database of cases of alleged human rights abuse and other misconduct committed by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol personnel since 2020. It’s too large, with over 370 entries, and I have some in my inbox that still need to be entered.

Among the most serious are cases in which agents have taken a life, in circumstances that don’t make clear that an imminent risk of death or bodily injury warranted use of deadly force.

This commentary, published today, lays out the 10 cases since 2020 in our database that stand out to us as “cases of fatalities since 2020 that may—pending the final outcome of investigations, complaints, and litigation—have violated the agencies’ Use of Force policy.”

It’s very troubling, and highlights problems with the DHS accountability process. Read it here.

Matamoros: not too dangerous to deport and expel, apparently

The city of Matamoros, where the 4 US citizens are kidnapped, is a dangerous place.

Matamoros is also the site of 184 US deportations of Mexican citizens every week.

And that doesn’t count Title 42 expulsions of Mexicans and non-Mexicans, I don’t have the exact number of expulsions to Matamoros but it’s probably at least 184 per week.

(Source for this table)

Family detention: even if you put aside the cruelty, it makes no sense

“It is heartbreaking to hear there could be a return to the Trump-era use of” family detention centers at the U.S.-Mexico border, migrant child advocate lawyer Leecia Welch told the New York Times, in an article published last night revealing that the Biden administration is considering reviving migrant family detention. The administration ceased the controversial practice in 2021.

It’s not just heartbreaking. It’s also nonsensical as a deterrent, and remarkably expensive.

As a deterrent: in January CBP encountered 38,308 members of migrant families, most of whom sought to turn themselves in and seek asylum. The monthly average during the Biden administration is 52,652 family members encountered each month.

Chart: "CBP Encounters with Family Unit Members at the U.S.-Mexico Border," showing how small 2,500 is compared to the total number of family apprehensions.

	Mar-20	Apr-20	May-20	Jun-20	Jul-20	Aug-20	Sep-20	Oct-20	Nov-20	Dec-20	Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	Sep-22	Oct-22	Nov-22	Dec-22	Jan-23
Encounters	4675	756	1082	1735	2118	2816	3981	4859	4391	4493	7401	19735	54291	50228	44902	56065	83804	87054	64613	42985	45364	52052	32242	26951	38173	55419	59791	51974	52324	52068	54266	60056	63544	77445	38308

Compare that to the 2,500 family detention bed spaces that the Trump administration maintained, for up to 20 days at a time per family. That’s perhaps 4,000 spaces per month. 4,000 out of 50,000 is an 8 percent chance of ending up in family detention for a few weeks while asylum officers consider the credibility of a family’s asylum claim. Those odds don’t make for much of a deterrent, if that’s the purpose of administration officials favoring a family detention revival.

Remarkably expensive: Here’s a screenshot from the Trump administration’s 2020 congressional budget request for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The administration was congratulating itself for lowering the daily cost of detaining a migrant family from $319.37 to $295.94 per night in payments to private contractors. (One can only imagine what sort of cutbacks in humane treatment that would have meant.)

Text and table from page 144 of the 2020 ICE Congressional Budget Justification. Last row of the table is circled:

Family Beds:
FFP contracts are used for detention beds, guard services, and healthcare at ICE’s three FRCs located in South Texas, Karnes County, and Berks
County. Since these contracts are fixed price, costs do not vary with the number of family detainees. ICE projects total costs of $270.1M in FY 2020
for family beds. The table below shows the break-out of these costs. Dividing the total funding requirement of $270.1M by the projected family ADP
of 2,500 results in an effective family bed rate of $295.94. As with adult beds, beginning in FY 2019, ICE no longer includes indirect expenses in the
derivation of its average daily bed rate for family beds following the SWC realignment.
Projected FFP Contract Costs
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 2018
Enacted
FY 2019
Projected
FY 2020
Projected
South Texas FRC with Healthcare $207,836 $211,161 $185,829
Karnes County FRC with Healthcare $61,002 $61,978 $64,578
Berks County FRC with Healthcare $11,296 $12,117 $12,780
Other Direct Costs $5,548 $5,637 $6,865
Total Direct Costs $286,312 $290,893 $270,052
Indirect Costs $5,112 N/A N/A
Total Costs $291,425 N/A N/A
Effective Family Bed Rate $319.37 $318.79 $295.94

Even if the Biden administration were to stick to that austerely low per-night rate, adjusting for inflation now raises it to $344.04 per family per night.

$344 per night to adopt a cruel policy that hardly constitutes a deterrent anyway? What exactly is the goal here?

Even the politics don’t make sense: family detention, if implemented, would horrify and demotivate an important portion of Democratic-leaning voters ahead of the 2024 elections. I urge Biden administration officials to drop this.

Migration data from Mexico

Here’s more than 16 years of Mexico’s monthly apprehensions of migrants.

January 2007-January 2023

	07-Jan						07-Jul						08-Jan						08-Jul						09-Jan						09-Jul						10-Jan						10-Jul						11-Jan						11-Jul						12-Jan						12-Jul						13-Jan						13-Jul						14-Jan						14-Jul						15-Jan						15-Jul						16-Jan						16-Jul						17-Jan						17-Jul						18-Jan						18-Jul						19-Jan						19-Jul						20-Jan						20-Jul						21-Jan						21-Jul						22-Jan						22-Jul						23-Jan
Apprehensions	11215	11910	12473	11796	12004	11095	10846	12520	9047	7292	6431	3826	8970	10787	9305	11031	9747	8394	7585	6705	6521	6894	5506	3278	5943	6246	6884	6742	5701	6872	5718	5789	6039	5450	4388	3261	4759	5796	7336	6695	7075	6378	6760	6755	5098	4714	5077	3659	4430	5087	6695	6471	7852	5717	5215	5299	5586	5453	5267	3511	6343	7442	9291	8732	8874	8082	6860	6496	8746	7879	6364	3397	6699	7407	8290	7951	7718	7370	7471	7443	6657	7549	7300	4443	6295	8317	10502	8621	10132	12515	11005	11618	11111	13700	13671	9662	18299	14885	16569	17085	19402	17152	17195	17088	15450	18232	14755	12029	11218	11420	14253	16700	16454	14850	13604	16502	19811	20494	17579	13331	10553	7275	5905	5243	7071	7471	7863	9171	7757	9678	9227	6632	9248	11549	11779	11486	10350	9577	8965	13560	13903	18895	12663	6637	8521	10194	13508	21197	23241	31396	19822	16066	13517	12256	9727	7305	14119	8377	8421	2628	2251	2304	4737	7445	8831	12253	9557	6337	9564	12893	18548	22968	20091	19249	25830	43031	46370	41580	29264	18291	23382	24304	30753	31206	33290	30423	33902	42719	43792	52201	49485	48982	36147

Data table is here.

Zooming in on Mexico’s apprehensions of migrants, by nationality, since January 2022:

Chart: Mexico’s Migrant Apprehensions (Since 2022)

January 2023: Ecuador 16%, Venezuela 15%, Guatemala 11.1%, Honduras 10.6%, All Others <8%
Since January 2022: Venezuela 21%, Honduras 16%, Guatemala 15%, Cuba 9.2%, Nicaragua 8.9%, All Others <7%

	22-Jan	22-Feb	22-Mar	22-Apr	22-May	22-Jun	22-Jul	22-Aug	22-Sep	22-Oct	22-Nov	22-Dec	23-Jan
Venezuela	2733	1120	1209	1960	1640	3919	6431	16885	15381	21781	12298	11721	5314
Honduras	5841	5929	6390	6457	7544	6507	7461	5741	5309	5475	5895	4379	3847
Guatemala	6304	5191	6075	6920	7222	7010	6578	4927	4932	4632	5380	4344	4017
Cuba	2214	3384	6333	6103	3191	2481	2550	2159	3244	3247	3318	3251	2815
Nicaragua	2234	1843	2701	2854	3474	1561	2182	2327	4062	5711	7329	4547	2151
Colombia	503	2986	3375	1746	3031	2840	2169	2479	2704	2179	2225	2041	912
El Salvador	1565	1721	2338	2579	3307	1990	2936	2544	2471	2144	2379	1271	1212
Ecuador	246	202	276	513	780	668	719	1185	1528	3266	4459	8314	5808
Other countries	1742	1928	2056	2074	3101	3447	2876	4472	4161	3766	6202	9114	10071
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