Adam Isacson

Defense, security, borders, migration, and human rights in Latin America and the United States. May not reflect my employer’s consensus view.

Archives

Today’s testimony

It was fun—at times—to engage with senators on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee this morning on Republican-led proposals to revive the “Remain in Mexico” policy. There’s a lot to say about it and I’ll post more later. For now:

WOLA’s landing page is here. Here’s the text of my opening statement:

Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Peters, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.

I did a lot of fieldwork and data work along the U.S.-Mexico border when Remain in Mexico—MPP—was first implemented. The evidence I saw is clear: Remain in Mexico enriched cartels. It failed to meaningfully deter migration. And it soured relations with a key ally. Pursuing it again would harm U.S. interests.

Instead, I urge this Committee to focus on fixing our asylum system. That system saves tens of thousands of lives each year, but we need it to be both fair and efficient. No one supports the idea of five-year waits for asylum decisions: the backlogs create a pull factor of their own. But this is an administrative challenge, and the U.S. government is good at handling administrative challenges. It’s just a question of processing, case management, and adjudication.

People truly did suffer while remaining in Mexico. I personally heard harrowing accounts of torture and abuse. Nearly all of that abuse was the work of organized crime groups, or cartels.

The cartels’ cruelty and sadism wasn’t just a human rights issue, though. These criminals aren’t barbaric just for its own sake. This is their economic model, and that makes it a national security issue.

Organized crime is trying to extract as much money out of migrants and their loved ones as it can while those migrants are present on the “turf” that they control. Cartels fight each other for this business.

“Remain in Mexico” kept migrants on cartels’ turf for very long periods of time: months or even years in Mexican border cities waiting for their hearings. MPP created a new market opportunity for cartels.

That’s a big difference from CBP One. The app also requires months-long waits to come to a U.S. port of entry, but it makes it easier to wait elsewhere, in parts of Mexico that are safer than its northern border zone, where states are under State Department travel warnings because of cartel crime and kidnapping.

When outsiders are waiting for months in Mexico’s border zone, they are sitting ducks for the cartels:

  • First, there was extortion: foreigners had to pay just to exist for that long in cartel-controlled neighborhoods. If you don’t pay, it’s not safe to go outside your shelter.
  • Second, if people wanted to give up on the long wait for MPP, cartels offered “coyote” services: the chance to cross the border and try to evade Border Patrol. They charge several thousand dollars for that.
  • Third was kidnapping for ransom: cartels held people in horrific conditions, raping and torturing them, as their relatives—frequently in the United States—had to wire thousands of dollars to free them.

The financial scale of this exploitation is staggering. Let’s consider it. Take a conservative estimate of $1,000 per migrant in extortions, ransoms, or coyote fees—I ran that figure by some border-area experts and they laughed at how low that estimated amount is. Multiply that by 71,000 people in MPP, and you get $71 million in cartel profits, an amount equal to the annual base salaries of 1,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents.

For all that, Remain in Mexico didn’t really do that much to reduce or control migration.

For more than 10 years now, there’s been a series of crackdowns on asylum seekers. My testimony maps them out in a graphic. These crackdowns follow the same pattern: you get an initial drop in migration numbers, it lasts a few months, and then there’s a rebound.

Title 42 and its expansions? A classic example. So was “Remain in Mexico.”

After it expanded in June 2019, Border Patrol’s apprehensions did fall for four months. Then the migration numbers plateaued—at the same level they were in mid-2018. In fact, at the same level as the Obama administration’s eight-year monthly average. And that’s where the numbers stayed.

And then in the first months of 2020, Border Patrol apprehensions started rising. They were on pace to grow by a double-digit percentage from February to March. But then COVID came, and all but ended March 10 days early.

Title 42 ended up eclipsing Remain in Mexico: no more hearing dates; asylum seekers got expelled. Remain in Mexico became irrelevant and the Trump administration rarely used it again.

MPP also strained relations with Mexico. The Mexican government at first resisted the program, agreeing to it only after very heavy diplomatic pressure. This complicated cooperation on other shared priorities.

There are a lot of those priorities, from trade to fentanyl. Mexico is one of the ten largest countries in the world, with the 14th-largest economy. The border is just one reason why the United States needs good relations with Mexico.

Compelling Mexico to agree to a new Remain in Mexico takes bandwidth away from those priorities. Why do all that for a policy that actually enriches drug cartels? Why do all that for a policy that doesn’t even have a clear and lasting effect on migration?

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Email Update is Out

Here’s a new “weekly” e-mail about stuff I’ve been working on, for those who’ve signed up to receive them.

My posting schedule is all thrown off by travel and testifying in Congress, so this one is late and the next one probably will be, too. But when a lot is going on, there’s a lot to inform about, so I’ll keep these coming.

If you visit this site a lot, you probably don’t need an e-mail, too. But if you’d like to get more-or-less regular e-mail updates, scroll to the bottom of this page or click here.

WOLA Podcast: From Promise to Pressure: Bernardo Arévalo’s First Year in Power in Guatemala

The first WOLA podcast of 2025 is with my colleague Ana María Méndez, who runs our Central America program. The president of Guatemala, Bernardo Arévalo, finished his first year in office on January 14. He’s one of the most unlikely of 2020s Latin American presidents: a mild-mannered democratic institutionalist. So of course he’s having a rough time of it. Listen here, Ana María is a native of Guatemala and a great explainer. Here’s the text of the landing page at WOLA’s site.

In this podcast episode WOLA’s Central America Director, Ana María Méndez Dardón, reflects on Bernardo Arévalo’s first year in office, as January 14, 2025 marks one year since the inauguration that followed his unexpected election.

As we discussed with Ana María in a podcast episode shortly after his inauguration, Bernardo Arévalo and his Semilla party had a very difficult time reaching inauguration day, notably due to active obstruction from Guatemala’s traditional, ruling elites, including the Attorney General’s Office. While citizen mobilization, largely indigenous groups’ mobilization, made it possible for Arevalo to democratically take office, the difficulties he and his party faced back then have remained, making it difficult to govern and, in turn, negatively affecting his popularity due to unmet expectations.

Three prominent obstacles that the Arevalo administration will continue to face from his first year to his second, Ana María highlights, are the office of the Attorney General and the powerful presence of other known corrupt actors within the government; the instability of his cabinet paired with a small presence of his party in Congress; and the powerful private sector’s ties to corrupt elite groups.

The Attorney General’s office has played an active role in blocking access to justice and promoting the persecution and criminalization of those who have been key to anti-corruption and human rights efforts, while maintaining the threat of forcibly removing Arévalo from office. Although Attorney General Consuelo Porras was sanctioned by the United States, along with 42 other countries, for significant corruption, Arévalo has determined that removing her would violate constitutional norms. (Her term ends in May 2026.) Ana María also notes alliances that Porras has cultivated with members of the U.S. Republican Party.

Despite the obstacles, Ana María notes possibilities for growth, including the launch of an alternative business association, a new national anti-extortion effort, and negotiation efforts with Congress.

Ana María also touches on the U.S.-Guatemala bilateral relationship during the Biden administration and expectations for the Trump-Arevalo relationship. During the Biden administration, it was evident that security and economic issues were top priorities, with notable bilateral engagement including multi-sectoral and multi-departmental efforts led by the Office of the Vice President to address the root causes of migration. It is uncertain whether the Trump administration will continue these efforts, and while some Republicans regard Arévalo as a strong democratic ally, the migration issue, particularly the incoming Trump administration’s plans to deter and deport migrants, may be the topline item in the bilateral relationship.

To follow Guatemalan developments, Ana María recommends independent media including Plaza Pública, Con Criterio, and Prensa Comunitaria.

Download this podcast episode’s .mp3 file here. Listen to WOLA’s Latin America Today podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeartRadio, or wherever you subscribe to podcasts. The main feed is here.

Testifying in the Senate Thursday morning

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs

Full Committee Hearing
Remain in Mexico
Date: January 16, 2025
Time: 9:00am
Location: Senate Dirksen Building, SD-342
THE HONORABLE KENNETH CUCCINELLI
Former Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary (2019-2021)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
ANDREW R. ARTHUR
Resident Fellow in Law and Policy
Center for Immigration Studies
ADAM ISACSON
Director for Defense Oversight
The Washington Office on Latin America

Tune in at 9:00 Eastern on Thursday when I testify in the Senate Homeland Security Committee in opposition to proposals to restart the “Remain in Mexico” program.

Remain in Mexico was a human rights travesty. It enriched Mexican organized crime. It complicated U.S.-Mexico relations. And in the end, it didn’t do much to deter migrants.

I look forward to making all of those points in a few days. Wish me luck—and I apologize if not much gets posted here over the next few days while I prepare testimony.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington and Online This Week

(Events that I know of, anyway. All times are U.S. Eastern.)

Tuesday, January 14

Wednesday, January 15

Thursday, January 16

  • 9:00 in Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building and online: Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Remain in Mexico.
  • 10:30-12:00 at wilsoncenter.org: USMCA 2026 Review: New Realities and Strategic Shifts in North American Trade (RSVP required).
  • 2:00-5:00 at ips-dc.org: Critical Raw Materials: The Impact of U.S.-China Competition (RSVP required).

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: January 10, 2025

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work.

THIS WEEK IN BRIEF:

Read More

Darién Gap Migration Plummeted Further in December

Panama reported 4,849 people migrating through the Darién Gap in December 2024, the fewest since March 2022. It is a likely sign that people have begun delaying their migration plans, for now, after Trump’s election.

Data table

Though the number of people transiting the jungle region dropped 42 percent from 2023’s record levels (from 520,085 to 302,203), 2024 was the second heaviest year ever for Darién Gap migration.

Data table

Note that the chart above shows that an important increase in Darién Gap migration happened from 2018 to 2019, when Donald Trump was in the White House. This migration flow, mostly citizens of Haiti and Cuba, was curtailed by the pandemic in 2020—but it shows that Trump’s first-administration policies didn’t deter people from trying to migrate after an initial “wait and see” phase.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington and Online This Week

(Events that I know of, anyway. All times are U.S. Eastern.)

Tuesday, January 7

  • 12:00-1:30 at stimson.org: The Hidden Costs: Transparency and the US Arms Trade (RSVP required).

Friday, January 10

  • 1:00 at atlanticcouncil.org: 2025 Preview: What might be the big stories shaping the Americas? (RSVP required).

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: December 20, 2024

Due to end-of-year staff vacation time, WOLA will not publish Border Updates for the next two weeks. Updates will resume on January 10, 2025.

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work.

THIS WEEK IN BRIEF:

November data showed migration levels at the border continuing to decline following Donald Trump’s election, to such an extent that, for the first time, port-of-entry arrivals exceeded Border Patrol apprehensions. Still, some reports from Texas point to an increase in mid-December as some people try to reach U.S. soil before Inauguration Day. Rumors sent some migrants to attempt to turn themselves in at a border wall gate in El Paso, where state forces repelled them violently. Caravans continue to form in southern Mexico, but none remain intact beyond Mexico’s southernmost states.

As Trump administration officials ramp up plans to deport undocumented migrants on a massive scale likely requiring the use of military aircraft, concern is sweeping throughout communities where many families are “blended”: citizens living with non-citizens. Fear is spreading in south Texas, while council members and law enforcement in San Diego disagree on cooperation.

Conservative media and Donald Trump complained bitterly about the Biden administration’s auctioning off of border wall parts left over when construction halted after Joe Biden’s January 2021 inauguration. In fact, the selloff was mandated by the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

THE FULL UPDATE:

Read More

Email Update is Out

Here’s a new “weekly” e-mail about stuff I’ve been working on, for those who’ve signed up to receive them.

It may be the last update I’ll send until the weekend of January 11-12. Next week, the last full week before Christmas, is a slow one, and I hope to hunker down and finish a big project (coding, not writing) that I’ve had on the shelf for months. I’ll unveil it at some point next year. So I don’t plan to produce much next week, other than a Border Update. If I do send another message next weekend, it will be thin.

This one is reasonably thick, though: in addition to the Border Update, below you’ll find a great podcast about Colombia, an exploration of the myth that Joe Biden was “soft” on border security and migration, a dig into migration data from the Darién Gap, links to some good readings, and links to three Latin America-related events that I know of during this last working week of 2024.

If you visit this site a lot, you probably don’t need an e-mail, too. But if you’d like to get more-or-less regular e-mail updates, scroll to the bottom of this page or click here.

WOLA Podcast: The Work of Urban Peace Continues in Colombia, Despite Frustrations

I appreciated this opportunity to catch up on Colombia’s peace processes, confusing political dynamics, and inspiring civil society struggles in a podcast interview with Gimena Sánchez, WOLA’s Colombia program director, who just returned from a visit there with a congressional delegation. Here’s the text of the landing page at WOLA’s website:

WOLA’s director for Colombia, Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, is just back from taking a U.S. congressional delegation to Colombia. In addition to Bogotá, the group visited Cali and the Pacific Coast port of Buenaventura.

The latter two cities are in the department of Valle del Cauca, Colombia’s third most populous. Much of the population is Afro-descendant, and Buenaventura, on the coast, is majority Black.

Buenaventura has a vibrant and resilient collection of community organizations, which have played a greater role in local governance since a 2017 general strike. The government of Gustavo Petro, which took office in 2022, has fostered a negotiation between gangs operating in the city, part of its nationwide “total peace” policy.

As at the national level, the results are mixed. The Petro government has sought to move forward many negotiations at once, and some are stalled. Implementation of the 2016 peace accord with the FARC suffers from bureaucratization and lack of organization more than from lack of political will—but it remains behind schedule. Rural areas are especially challenged: armed groups are strengthening in some areas, and the humanitarian situation has hit emergency levels all along Colombia’s Pacific coast. The election of Donald Trump may presage a U.S. administration urging a return to failed hardline approaches of the past.

Still, Gimena sees hope in urban, participatory peacebuilding efforts in places like Buenaventura, Medellín, and in Quibdó, the capital of Chocó. The remarkable resilience and persistence of Colombia’s civil society, including Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities in and near Valle del Cauca, continue to be a source of inspiration and innovation.

Download this podcast episode’s .mp3 file here. Listen to WOLA’s Latin America Today podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeartRadio, or wherever you subscribe to podcasts. The main feed is here.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington and Online This Week

(Events that I know of, anyway. All times are U.S. Eastern.)

Tuesday, December 17

  • 11:30 at migrationpolicy.org: The Biden Legacy on Immigration: A Complex Picture (RSVP required).

Wednesday, December 18

  • 2:00 on Border Network for Human Rights Zoom: Report from the Border: What to expect from the Trump’s Administration on Border Militarization and Immigration Enforcement (RSVP required).

Thursday, December 19

  • 10:00-11:30 at csis.org: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights in American Foreign Policy (RSVP required).

Did Joe Biden Encourage the Big 2021-2023 Migration Increase?

If the text below reads like a Twitter thread, that’s where it comes from. It’s a response to arguments from New York Times columnist David Leonhardt making some sweeping mischaracterizations of what happened at the U.S.-Mexico border during the Biden years.

Leonhardt’s words go a long way toward cementing in place a growing view in elite opinion that Democrats lost the election because Joe Biden’s administration was “too soft” on migrants. According to this view, the administration failed to crack down out of fear of offending “the groups”—in this case, migrants’ rights defenders.

In fact, Biden was never “soft” and the groups were disillusioned from the get-go. His revocation of a few of the most severely anti-migrant Trump policies does not explain why migration increased during his term. Leonhardt’s inaccurate claims risk pushing moderate Democrats—who read and cite him—into adopting much of Trump’s approach to the border and migration.

Here’s the thread, which is getting massive numbers on Twitter because of a boost from New Republic writer Greg Sargent.

We need to address this notion that Biden somehow swung the door open to migrants. He kept in place the harshest ban on asylum ever: Title 42. It just didn’t deter a migrant population that changed dramatically.

During Donald Trump’s term, 90+ percent of migrants were from Mexico and Central America (blue, green, brown, yellow in the chart below). If you were a migrant from those countries, your probability of being released into the United States after apprehension didn’t change much after Biden’s inauguration.

Data table

(An exception is unaccompanied children from Central America: Biden stopped Trump’s practice of expelling them, alone, back into their countries regardless of protection needs. The moral argument for doing that is self-evident, and it didn’t move the needle much overall.)

Migrants may have found Biden’s initial moves and rhetoric encouraging? But Biden kept in place Stephen Miller’s Title 42 expulsions policy, which shut down asylum for everyone who could be deported easily. Ending “Remain in Mexico” didn’t matter, Title 42 had eclipsed it.

This chart shows that the Biden administration continued applying Title 42, expelling people as vigorously as possible (orange). But yes, the chart shows a decline in the _percentage_ of people being expelled in 2021.

Data table

That is not Biden being soft-hearted toward migrants. Instead, it reflects a historic change in the migrant population: new nationalities began arriving in ways unimaginable before 2021.

Just as Joe Biden was being inaugurated, the world’s borders were opening up post-pandemic. So did new migration routes like the Darién Gap.

The U.S.-Mexico border became accessible to people from very distant countries. South America and beyond. This had never happened before. By 2023, Mexico and Central America were just 55 percent of migrants at the border. By early 2024, one in nine were from Europe, Asia, or Africa.

Data table

You may have noticed that these countries are far away. It’s costly to deport people to them—if it’s even possible diplomatically—because you have to fly them. More had to be released into the U.S. interior to seek asylum.

Expulsions across a land border are way cheaper than by air. Under Trump, Mexico agreed to take back Title 42 expulsions from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Biden admin worked on Mexico to agree to take expelled people from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Biden expanded Title 42! It was a huge crackdown, especially on Mexicans and Central Americans (blue). But the overall flow of people from distant countries (green) was even larger, more than Mexico could absorb on its own.

When Title 42 ended, Biden placed a ban on asylum access on everyone who passed through a third country and didn’t get an asylum denial there. But the same challenge remained: people from distant countries who are hard to return. Numbers kept growing.

In late 2023, in yet another Biden crackdown, the admin leaned on Mexico to intensify its own efforts to block migrants crossing the country. It is unprecedented for Mexico to have sustained a migration crackdown for this long; they usually erode after a few months.

And then in June, Biden put in place an overall ban on asylum access between ports of entry, which lowered numbers further.

A common media question is “why did Biden wait so long” to ban asylum, a right enshrined in U.S. law. Because it’s probably illegal to do so? Because blanket bans on entry don’t apply to people who are already on U.S. soil, as courts told Trump?

In sum, it’s hard to argue that Biden did much to make the border more open for migrants. Those from Mexico and CentAm faced similar low odds of avoiding expulsion, compared to Trump. Those from elsewhere are harder to remove—but they are a new phenomenon Trump never faced.

This thread is already too long, so it doesn’t discuss the enormous human cost of these asylum denial policies, which WOLA and others have documented at length. That whole vital line of argument doesn’t seem to have much sway with the “Biden wasn’t harsh enough” crowd.

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: December 13, 2024

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work.

THIS WEEK IN BRIEF:

Following likely confirmation of the incoming Trump administration’s choice for Homeland Security secretary, the 119th Congress will move by late January on a package of hardline border and immigration measures whose total cost could be more than $100 billion. As it will move under a special Senate rule called “reconciliation,” it could pass the chamber, where Republicans lead by a 53-47 margin, by a simple majority.

Without offering much detail, President-Elect Trump and other White House officials have been previewing plans to carry out a promised campaign of mass deportations of undocumented migrants in the United States. They are exhibiting a willingness to deport U.S. citizen children together with their undocumented parents, and are preparing aggressive tactics against Democratic state and local officials who do not cooperate.

Many migrants cannot be deported quickly or inexpensively because they come from distant countries, or countries whose governments do not allow deportation flights. The incoming Trump administration is seeking third countries to accept some deportees, including a reluctant Mexico that may already find itself receiving large numbers of its own citizens across the land border. Impacts of imminent policy changes are evident all along the U.S.-bound migration route, including the Darién Gap which saw, in November, the lightest migration flow since April 2022.

The incoming administration announced nominees to head CBP and ICE, along with White House and ambassadorial choices. CBP nominee Rodney Scott, a former Border Patrol chief, is an outspoken critic of the Biden administration whose past activities raise concerns among rights defenders. A former Border Patrol union chief is the nominee to head the U.S. embassy in Chile.

THE FULL UPDATE:

Read More

Darién Gap Migration Plummeted in November

Panama’s government published data on Friday about migration through the Darién Gap, a treacherous jungle region straddling the country’s border with Colombia that until recently was considered too dangerous to walk through. People who attempt the 70-mile route frequently perish of drownings and attacks by animals and—more often—by criminals. Robberies and sexual violence are terribly common.

Despite that, the Darién Gap has become a heavily transited migration route since the COVID-19 pandemic began to ease. 1.2 million people have migrated through the Darién Gap between 2021 and 2024, more than 10 times the 115,758 people who made the journey in the 11 years between 2010 and 2020.

Data table

During the first 11 months of 2024, 277,354 people, 70 percent of them citizens of Venezuela, traversed the Darién route. That is down 44 percent from the 495,459 people who crossed the Darién Gap in 2023, the record year.

The most intense months of Darién Gap migration were August and September of 2023, when more than 2,500 people per day crossed the jungle. Migration dropped with the heaviest months of the rainy season (note October and especially November dropping every year on the chart below), and recovered only modestly at the beginning of 2024.

Data table

It’s not clear why Darién Gap migration didn’t climb all the way back up to August-September levels in early January 2024. Likely explanations could be word getting out about Mexico’s stepped-up efforts to block migrants, which began in January, and perhaps some Venezuelans postponing plans pending the outcome of July’s presidential elections, whose result the Nicolás Maduro regime ended up ignoring.

Migration fell further in July, after Panama inaugurated a president, Raúl Mulino, who took office promising to crack down on Darién Gap migration. Some migrants may have paused their plans amid news of stepped-up, U.S.-backed deportation flights from Panama. Panama’s government operated 34 deportation flights between August and November, removing about 1,370 people who had migrated through the region. While that is equal to about 1.8 percent of the total Darién Gap migration, the flights may have deterred some, at least for now.

Panama’s data show that November 2024 saw the fewest Darién Gap migrants of any month since April 2022. That is somewhat surprising, since one would expect the waves of repression following Venezuela’s failed election to have spurred more people to abandon Venezuela and head north. That appeared to be happening in September and October, when Venezuelan migration increased.

A key reason for November’s drop may be the weather. November is the height of the rainy season in southern Central America: the Darién paths are especially treacherous, and maritime routes can be dangerous. A report published Friday by Colombia’s migration agency shows that on at least three days last month, the boats leading to the Darién route’s starting point from the ports of Necoclí and Turbo, Colombia, were shut down completely by climate conditions.

There could also be a “Trump effect.” The November 5 election of a virulently anti-immigrant president in the United States may also be causing would-be migrants to change their plans, for now, until they have better information about what may await them.

Email Update is Out

Here’s a new “weekly” e-mail about stuff I’ve been working on, for those who’ve signed up to receive them.

It has the weekly Border Update; an “explainer” and a podcast about Trump already starting to threaten Mexico; some notes on Trump’s troubling nominee to head Customs and Border Protection; two pieces about remarkable border and migration data; a CNN Español interview about Colombia; links to some good readings; and links to 10 upcoming Latin America-related events.

If you visit this site a lot, you probably don’t need an e-mail, too. But if you’d like to get more-or-less regular e-mail updates, scroll to the bottom of this page or click here.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington and Online This Week

(Events that I know of, anyway. All times are U.S. Eastern.)

Monday, December 9

  • 11:00 at the Atlantic Council and atlanticcouncil.com: Driving smart cities in Latin America and the Caribbean (RSVP required).

Tuesday, December 10

Wednesday, December 11

  • 9:15-10:30 at the Inter-American Dialogue and thedialogue.org: Women, Financial Inclusion, and Family Remittances in Guatemala (RSVP required).
  • 1:00-2:00 at WOLA and wola.org: La Paz Total, El Capitulo Étnico y la Hermandad Afro Americana (RSVP required).
  • 2:00 in Room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building and online: Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations entitled The Communist Cuban Regime’s Disregard for Human Rights.

Notes on Trump’s Pick to Head CBP

President-Elect Trump has nominated Rodney Scott as the next commissioner of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. government’s leading border security agency, which includes Border Patrol and runs official border crossings from the Mexico border to ports and airports. Scott, a career Border Patrol agent, was chief of the Patrol during the last year of the Trump administration and the first few months of the Biden administration, which dismissed him.

In 2023, I launched a website that tracks allegations of abuse, corruption, and misconduct at U.S. border agencies through an online database. (This project has fallen out of date because it lacks funding—a grant ran out in early 2024. I’m working to convince philanthropic organizations to back the 10-12 expert person-hours per week that its upkeep would require, but I’ve had no luck so far.)

Rodney Scott comes up four times in this database. The often troubling events and allegations are below.

Late November 2021: Rodney Scott, the Trump administration’s last Border Patrol chief who exited his position in August, faced a San Diego Superior Court judge for a September tweet in which he advised former Border Patrol agent turned activist Jenn Budd, who has recounted being raped at the Border Patrol academy, to “lean back, close your eyes, and just enjoy the show.” [On December 6, 2024 Budd wrote on BlueSky, “The judge found that he did make the rape threat, he admitted to hav[ing] CBP open an investigation on me, & I still lost the case.”] Budd also posted screenshots on Twitter showing Scott among those on private CBP and Border Patrol agents’ Facebook groups sharing images of Border Patrol shoulder patches reading “Let’s Go Brandon,” a right-wing euphemism for “F— Joe Biden.”

October 25, 2021: A strongly (and explicitly) worded report from the House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Reform, issued on October 25, detailed the disciplinary process following 2019 revelations of a secret Facebook page at which CBP personnel posted racist, violent, and lewd content (original link). The Committee discovered that for most involved, consequences were light: they “had their discipline significantly reduced and continued to work with migrants” (original link)… “CBP knew about Border Patrol agents’ inappropriate posts on ‘I’m 10-15’ since 2016, three years before it was reported publicly,” the House Committee found. Among the Facebook group’s members were Border Patrol’s last two chiefs, Carla Provost (2018-2020) and Rodney Scott (2020-August 2021). Both indicated that they followed the group in order to monitor agents’ attitudes and complaints.

September 29, 2021: A letter to Justice Department leadership and the DHS Inspector-General from Alliance San Diego alleged that former Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott, who left his post in August 2021, had violated the Ethics in Government Act. Scott established a consulting firm in July 2021, while still working for Border Patrol. On September 18, he issued a Facebook request for active-duty CBP and ICE personnel to provide information, possibly including restricted information, “to counter the lies and missinformation [sic.] that the DHS Secretary and Biden officials spew everytime they speak about the border.”

January 27, 2021: Relatives of Anastasio Hernández Rojas filed a brief before the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, contending that Border Patrol covered up, and improperly interfered with the investigation of, agents’ role in Hernández’s 2010 death. Video showed numerous Border Patrol agents and CBP officers beating and tasing a hogtied and handcuffed Hernández to death. The brief contended that the acting deputy chief patrol agent in Border Patrol’s San Diego Sector at the time, Rodney Scott, signed a potentially illegal subpoena to obtain Hernández’s autopsy. (Scott went on to be Border Patrol chief from 2020 to 2021.)

In a thread on BlueSky, the CBP Watch coalition posted links to news coverage of additional allegations:

  • In June 2018, during the height of the uproar over the Trump administration’s separations of migrant parents and children, Scott told Politico, “I would like to remind people too, when we look at a child in the United States and say, ‘Oh, that 14-year-old young man,’ or, ‘That’s an adult in a lot of other countries. That kid’s been working for years, may or may not have been associated with gangs.’ A lot of times, especially if there’s any kind of a use of force or a violent encounter with law enforcement, and the person’s under 18, people get this picture in their head that it’s like the kid that lives next door to you, and it’s not. Some of these kids are hardened adults, and I’m not going to say that that’s all of them. But look into it, pull the layers of the onion back a little bit more, and you’ll find out most of these stories just are not true. They’re exaggerations.”
  • “Scott was chief of Border Patrol when the agency deployed BORTAC”—the agency’s elite, SWAT team-like force—“against protestors in Portland” after the killing of George Floyd in 2020.
  • “Scott was also directly implicated in expelling 13,000 unaccompanied children during title 42”—the 2020-2023 policy of removing asylum seekers without an opportunity to seek protection, in the name of pandemic response—“a policy that never got the press scrutiny it deserved (with some honorable exceptions).”

There was no reason not to expect Donald Trump to nominate someone with extremely hardline views to head CBP, someone who may worsen the climate for human rights abuse at an agency that already exhibits serious institutional culture problems. That’s what has happened—and as a career official and a known quantity among the Republican senators who will hold a majority next year, Rodney Scott will probably win confirmation.

I’ll be watching the confirmation closely, along with others in the human rights and government oversight communities. We’ll note how senators vote, and expect at least some to take their oversight role seriously by raising these allegations during the confirmation process. That’s why I’m gathering them all here, to make them available in one place.

Chart: Border Patrol Apprehensions by Country at the U.S.-Mexico Border Since October 2013

I mashed together data from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Homeland Security Statistics and from Customs and Border Protection to make this chart of the past 11 years’ Border Patrol apprehensions of migrants, by country.

Here’s the underlying data table, with statistics from 101 countries (note that OHSS does some rounding to the nearest 10).

A few things about what you see here:

  • This is just Border Patrol apprehensions: migrants caught out in the open areas between the official border crossings (ports of entry). I only have CBP port of entry data by country (which is smaller until very recently), for just 21 countries and a big “other” category, going back to October 2019.
  • Note how 10 months of the Trump administration (2017-2020) saw more migration than October 2024 (56,530 migrant apprehensions).
  • Note how the migrant population was almost completely Mexican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran before the pandemic, and far more diverse after it.
  • You can see the early 2024 drop resulting from Mexico’s ongoing crackdown on migrants trying to transit its territory, and then a further mid-2024 drop resulting from the Biden administration’s ban on nearly all asylum access for people who cross between the border’s ports of entry.

WOLA Q&A: Trump’s Threats of Tariffs as a Response to Migration and the Fentanyl Overdose Crisis

Here’s a brief piece that WOLA published yesterday about the aftermath of Donald Trump’s use of tariff threats to bully Mexico on migration and fentanyl. It’s co-authored with my WOLA colleagues Stephanie Brewer (Mexico) and John Walsh (Drug Policy). We also recorded a podcast together.

I wrote the part about migration. An excerpt is below, but I recommend reading the whole thing here.

Mexico’s 2024 crackdown has been its most intense ever. Since January, Mexico has averaged 115,636 blocked or encountered migrants per month—11 times the monthly average during Trump’s first administration. For the first time ever, Mexico’s number has equaled or even exceeded Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) and Border Patrol’s count of migrants encountered at the border. Mexico cracked down so swiftly that Border Patrol’s migrant apprehensions plummeted 50 percent in a single month, from December 2023 to January 2024: the sharpest month-to-month drop of the 21st century so far. This happened without a mention of tariffs or other punishments.

WOLA Podcast: A Tariff Threat Foreshadows U.S.-Mexico Relations During the Second Trump Presidency

Here’s a WOLA podcast episode recorded Wednesday (December 4) with my WOLA colleagues Stephanie Brewer (Mexico) and John Walsh (Drug Policy). Donald Trump’s crude tariff threat against Mexico and Canada last week tells a lot about what we’ll be dealing with over the next few years. It also showed a possible new side to Mexico’s responses to this sort of bullying. And meanwhile, we need never to lose sight of the absurdity and cruelty of the migration and drug policies that Trump is trying to force on the United States’ closest neighbors.

Here’s the text of the landing page at wola.org. And if you prefer text to audio, check out the brief Q&A explainer that we posted at the same time.

On November 25, President-Elect Donald Trump announced via social media that he would impose a 25 percent tariff on all imports from Mexico and Canada unless migration and fentanyl trafficking ceased entirely. The announcement caused widespread alarm, spurring a flurry of responses and an unclear conversation between Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum.

The event was instructive about what we might expect after Trump assumes the presidency in January, WOLA Director for Mexico Stephanie Brewer and Director for Drug Policy John Walsh observe in this episode.

Brewer explained the “tariff threat” incident, how it plays into the political agendas of both Trump and Sheinbaum, and the danger of doing serious damage to a multifaceted, interdependent bilateral relationship.

Host Adam Isacson, who covers border and migration policy at WOLA, joined the discussion to point out that Trump seeks to bully Mexico into carrying out a crackdown on migration that has, in fact, already been underway for some time—with serious human rights implications.

Walsh observed that demands on Mexico to crack down on fentanyl threaten a reversion to supply-side, prohibitionist approaches to a complex drug problem that not only haven’t worked over the past 50 years, but may in fact have ceded much control to armed and criminal groups.

The U.S.-Mexico border, and the bilateral relationship, may be marked by these episodes of threat and bluster for much of the next few years. Weathering this period will require civil society in both the United States and Mexico to play an aggressive role, demanding “steadiness, focus on facts, keeping things grounded in reality,” and never losing sight of what better migration and drug policies would look like.

Download this podcast episode’s .mp3 file here. Listen to WOLA’s Latin America Today podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeartRadio, or wherever you subscribe to podcasts. The main feed is here.

Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: December 6, 2024

With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here.

Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work.

THIS WEEK IN BRIEF:

Preliminary data indicate that Border Patrol apprehended fewer migrants at the border in November than any month since July 2020. An expected post-election rush, with migrants seeking to get to the United States before Donald Trump’s inauguration, has not happened. In southern Mexico, though, people appear to be arriving in larger numbers and seeking to migrate in large groups.

President-Elect Trump appeared to pull down his November 25 threat to slap tariffs on Mexican and Canadian goods until they stop the entry of migrants and drugs, following a reportedly cordial phone call with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. However, Sheinbaum showed a willingness to push back, disputing Trump’s characterization of what was agreed. A future area of disagreement may be Mexico’s willingness to accept deportations of migrants from third countries.

This section lists several analyses and reports about the incoming administration’s hardline approach to the border and migration. Topics include potential use of the U.S. military, the Texas state government’s crackdown serving as a model or template, the shaky future of alternative migration pathways, and signs that at least some Democrats are moving rightward.

THE FULL UPDATE:

Read More

Biden-Era Border Patrol Apprehensions Hit New Low

“U.S. authorities made about 46,700 arrests for illegally crossing the border from Mexico in November, down about 17% from October to a new low for Joe Biden’s presidency,” reported the Associated Press’s Elliot Spagat.

That is the fewest people crossing unauthorized between border ports of entry since July 2020, early in the pandemic. Here’s what it looks like:

Data table

The chart shows:

  • Migration rising in the final months of the Trump administration, as the “Title 42” pandemic expulsions policy ceased to deter people from coming to the border.
  • A big jump in migration in early 2021, after Trump left office and the world’s borders reopened several months into the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • A drop in January 2024 as Mexico’s government, at the Biden administration’s behest, started cracking down harder on migrants transiting the country.
  • A further drop in June 2024 as the Biden administration, in a questionably legal move, banned most asylum access between border ports of entry.
  • Many observers, including me, expected more migrants stranded in Mexico to rush to the border after Donald Trump won the November 5 election, seeking to get to U.S. soil before Inauguration Day on January 20. That is not happening, at least not yet. It may still happen, and activity is increasing in southern Mexico. Still, as the end-of-year holidays usually bring a lull in migration, it might not happen at all.

Latin America-Related Events in Washington and Online This Week

(Events that I know of, anyway. All times are U.S. Eastern.)

Monday, December 2

  • 10:00 at acleddata.com: Is ‘Total Peace’ still possible? A conversation on Colombia’s armed groups under Petro (RSVP required).

Tuesday, December 3

  • 10:00-11:00 at CSIS and csis.org: Addressing Maduro’s Oil Lifeline in the Wake of a Stolen Election (RSVP required).
  • 8:00pm at NACLA Zoom: Venezuela in the New Trump Era (RSVP required).

Wednesday, December 4

  • 9:00-12:30 at the Brookings Institution and brookings.edu: The fentanyl epidemic in North America and the global reach of synthetic opioids (RSVP required).
  • 10:30 at atlanticcouncil.org: El Salvador’s economic evolution: Investment insights and opportunities (RSVP required).
  • 11:00-12:30 at insightcrime.org: Behind Bars, Beyond Control: The Fall of Ecuador’s Prisons and the Rise of Its Mafias (RSVP required).
  • 12:00-2:00 at eff.org: Virtual Wall: Surveillance Tech at the U.S.-Mexico Border

Thursday, December 5

  • 10:30-12:00 at the Wilson Center and wilsoncenter.org: The Next President of the United States: Challenges and Recommendations for the US-Mexico Relationship (RSVP required).

Mexico is Already Blocking as Many Migrants as CBP and Border Patrol Are

<Edit, November 27:> It was great talking to Greg Sargent yesterday for an excellent New Republic piece that embeds the below graphic.

All this paves the way for larger deceptions later. Bank on it: The moment Trump takes office, the lower apprehension numbers will magically become real metrics. Fox News will start trumpeting them and he’ll start claiming the border has achieved pacification due to his strength. Indeed, Trump very well may credit his current threat of tariffs with “forcing” Mexico to make the lower numbers of border crossings a reality.

…[W]e may not be prepared for the gale-force agitprop that’s about to hit us.

</Edit>

Yesterday the President-Elect promised to levy tariffs on Mexico and Canada for not doing enough to stop migration to the U.S. border.

However, Mexico’s security and migration forces (green in the chart) are already encountering and impeding, in their territory, about as many migrants as U.S. forces do at the border. In July, they stopped more people than their U.S. counterparts did.

Migrant Encounters: CBP at the U.S.-Mexico Border, and Mexico Throughout its Territory

United States:
	Between the Ports of Entry (Border Patrol)	CBP at the Ports of Entry
23-Oct	188749	52178
23-Nov	191106	51293
23-Dec	249740	52241
24-Jan	124215	51980
24-Feb	140641	49272
24-Mar	137473	51886
24-Apr	128895	50842
24-May	117905	52811
24-Jun	83532	46883
24-Jul	56400	47700
24-Aug	58009	49464
24-Sep	53858	47932
24-Oct	56530	49814

	Mexico
23-Oct	91581
23-Nov	97204
23-Dec	94816
24-Jan	113839
24-Feb	118865
24-Mar	117973
24-Apr	114514
24-May	125499
24-Jun	121589
24-Jul	116243
24-Aug	96563
24-Sep	
24-Oct

(Mexico hasn’t yet updated its September and October numbers. Underlying numbers are in the image’s alt text.)

CNN Español: “Estados Unidos prohíbe la entrada del General retirado colombiano Mario Montoya”

Here’s a CNN Español segment I recorded at the studio (which is one neighborhood away from home) on Monday evening. It’s about State Department sanctioning, for serious human rights allegations, a general who was a key U.S. “partner” at the outset of Plan Colombia in the early 2000s. Also, the Colombian government’s request to pardon a FARC leader currently in the federal Supermax prison in Colorado after being extradited in 2005.

My Kid, in Korea

My daughter Margaret has been spending this first semester of her junior year studying at Yonsei University in South Korea, a country that she’s followed closely since discovering K-Pop in junior high. Between that and a summer program, she’ll have spent five of the last six months of 2024 on the other side of the planet. Not bad for a 20-year-old.

She’s been posting regular updates about her travels to her blog, with dozens of photos. The latest post is about recent jaunts outside of Seoul, visiting cities in the country’s interior.

I post this as a proud parent—and as someone who can use his own site to post some links and prod search engine crawlers in her direction.

Email Update is Out

Here’s a new “weekly” e-mail about stuff I’ve been working on, for those who’ve signed up to receive them.

It has the weekly Border Update; some links to coverage of organized crime-tied government corruption during the past month; five interesting readings from last week; and some other items that I’ve posted here over the past week.

There are no “upcoming events” in the e-mail, nor will I post any here. Next week is punctuated by the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States (Thursday the 28th), so little will be happening. I will also skip next week’s e-mail update.

If you visit this site a lot, you probably don’t need an e-mail, too. But if you’d like to get more-or-less regular e-mail updates, scroll to the bottom of this page or click here.

Organized Crime-Tied Corruption in the Americas: Links from the Past Month

Over the past month, I managed to add 69 stories with the tag “Organized Crime” to my database of Latin American security-related news and reports.

Breaking deep, corrupt links and collusion between governments and criminal organizations must be at the core of any strategy to weaken organized crime and make people feel safer. Despite that, of the 69 articles, just 12 (7 from Mexico alone) documented examples of official collusion with organized crime. They are linked below.

Chile

As Chile arrests more gang members, the race is on to stop the prison system from becoming a new command nucleus for organized crime. Preventing corruption is going to be a key part of that effort.

“Criminal organization and state corruption are two sides of the same coin,” said Fernando Guzman, a judge who has made regular visits to Santiago I. “It is impossible to build a powerful criminal enterprise, with significant profitability, without an alliance with some state agencies.”

There have been some isolated cases of corruption among the police force and prison guards.

Colombia

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) has forwarded copies of investigations to the Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court of Justice and Case 08 of the same JEP so that the respective judicial processes can be carried out against a major general of the Army, six State agents and three civilians, accused by Dairo Antonio Úsuga David, alias ‘Otoniel’, for their alleged collaboration with paramilitary groups.

Among those investigated by the JEP is Major General Carlos Omairo Lemus Pedraza, who was commander of the XVIII Brigade of the National Army between 2000 and 2003. According to the testimony of the former paramilitary chief, Lemus allegedly collaborated with the paramilitaries, allowing the expansion of these groups in the Arauca region. Alongside him are several former governors and officials such as Julio Acosta Bernal, former governor of Arauca, and Helí Cala López, former governor in charge of Casanare, who allegedly facilitated the presence and operation of the paramilitaries in their respective regions.

Other prominent names include Óscar Raúl Iván Flórez Chávez, former governor of Casanare, and Milton Rodríguez Sarmiento, former senator, both accused of alleged participation in the consolidation of paramilitary control in Casanare and their support for the AUC. Also mentioned are businessmen such as Andrés Rueda Gómez, former secretary of infrastructure of Casanare, and Sergio Hernández Gamarra, former rector of the University of Cartagena, who allegedly collaborated financially with the AUC in contracts that favored these groups.

… The collaboration of these state actors with the paramilitaries not only allowed these groups to increase their power in the regions of Casanare and Arauca, but also consolidated territorial control that led to multiple human rights violations. In Casanare, for example, political and business actors facilitated contracts and resources that financed the operations of the Centauros Bloc, while in Arauca, the AUC, with the backing of local authorities and members of the security forces, managed to consolidate their dominance to combat other insurgent groups and control the region.

Haiti

In Solino, Garry Jean-Joseph, 33, blamed the police for the ongoing violence. “I left with nothing,” he said. “The people of Solino do not understand last night, the conspiracy of the policemen and the Live Together (Viv Ansanm) soldiers.”

The resident described how at 2 a.m., a policeman in an armored car told residents to go home and that they would secure the neighborhood. However, shortly afterward residents could hear gangs invading. “The police delivered Solino,” he added.

Some officers with Haiti’s National Police have been long accused of corruption and working with gangs.

Mexico

Germán Reyes Reyes, the retired military officer accused of ordering the assassination of Chilpancingo municipal president Alejandro Arcos, served as a prosecutor for serious crimes from 2022 to 2024. In the new municipal administration, he was placed in charge of the Public Security Secretariat. His career in the state capital was cut short on November 12, when he was arrested by the National Guard and the Army. In the initial hearing, the Public Prosecutor accused the official of being part of the criminal group Los Ardillos. The judge evaluated the evidence and ordered preventive detention.

The following day the Army issued a communiqué distancing itself from the accused; however, it had endorsed his appointment as prosecutor when Lieutenant Sandra Luz Valdovinos was appointed attorney general. So far in Evelyn Salgado Pineda’s administration, the investigation of the crimes is in the hands of the Army. The results have been disastrous because most of the investigation files are not prosecuted, and high-impact crimes have increased in the state’s eight regions.

While the kidnapping of [top Sinaloa cartel leader Ismael “El Mayo”] Zambada has broken the order that existed around drug trafficking in Sinaloa, little is said about the conflict between Governor Rocha [Rubén Rocha Moya] and former university president [Héctor] Cuén, the genesis of the de facto state of emergency in Culiacán.

… Then comes 2021. Cuén, more astute than Rocha, sold Morena on the need for an alliance with PAS [a local political party] and agreed that Rocha would be the gubernatorial candidate in exchange for him being appointed Secretary of Government or Senator. Several local media published that the elections had been won with the help of Zambada and the Guzmans, who threaten opposition politicians and move people around. Once the governorship was pocketed, Rocha offered him the Secretary of Health.

The newly elected mayor of Chilpancingo, Mexico, had appointed Germán Reyes as the man who would safeguard his city.

But on Tuesday, the Mexican authorities arrested Mr. Reyes, a retired military officer and former prosecutor, accusing him of ordering the mayor’s brutal killing in southwest Mexico last month in a case that had already shocked a nation reeling from widespread violence against local politicians.

…State prosecutors on Tuesday announced the arrest of Mr. Reyes, 46, the city’s security chief, on a charge of aggravated homicide, saying he colluded with a local criminal group to abduct and assassinate the mayor.

The implication was that Reyes – who was also a former military officer who, according to his official resume, retired with rank of captain in the military justice system – had somehow worked in collusion with the gang.

That would suggest that at least one of the two warring gangs fighting for control of Chilpancingo controls, intimidates or works with officials there.

If Reyes is convicted, it would also be a stinging rebuke for a policy adopted by cities across Mexico of hiring retired military officers for top local police jobs, on the assumption that they are less prone to corruption.

It was also revealing that state detectives had to rely on federal forces—soldiers and the National Guard—to make the arrest, suggesting they may not have trusted state and local police who would normally carry out such tasks.

Heyman Vázquez, a Catholic priest who works in Ciudad Hidalgo, along the Guatemalan border, said criminal groups in southern Mexico have gone so far as to set up checkpoints along the main highway in an effort to identify migrants. “The authorities are involved,” he said about the kidnappings, adding that there’s a blurry line between the authorities charged with protecting migrants and the cartels exploiting them. “You never know who you’re talking to,” he said.

The Mexican government didn’t respond to requests for comment on allegations that organized crime has set up checkpoints along the highway in southern Mexico or that kidnappers may be collaborating with officials.

Ciudad Hidalgo Mayor Elmer Vázquez claimed to not know anything about migrant safe houses operating in the area and said his town always looks after migrants.

But Rev. Vázquez (no relation to the mayor), who has spent two decades defending migrants, said the prosecutor’s office, National Guard, special prosecutor for crimes against migrants do nothing even when crimes are reported.

“They are colluding with organized crime and, of course, they make it look like they’re doing their jobs,” he said.

In the specific case of Guanajuato, the attacks against police officers have been concentrated in the Laja – Bajío area, which is under the control of the Jalisco Cartel – New Generation (CJNG) and is disputed by the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL).

In an interview with MILENIO, public security consultant David Saucedo said that in the region, also known as the Huachicol Triangle, it is the criminal organization founded by José Antonio Yépez Ortiz – alias El Marro- that is fighting public security corporations.

According to documents from the National Defense Secretariat (Sedena) leaked by Guacamaya Leaks and cited by the consultant, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel had managed to infiltrate municipal and state security agencies and even the National Guard, from whom they received protection and support to escort tanks of stolen fuel leaving the Salamanca refinery.

With the CJNG’s violent incursion into Guanajuato municipalities and the so-called Industrial Corridor, the criminal organization currently headed by members of El Marro’s family has taken on the task of attacking security corporations that are not aligned with them.

The Santa Rosa Cartel does control some municipal police in the state of Guanajuato but others do not. Others are out of their control and that is where they have launched a combat strategy, especially in Celaya which is their economic capital and where they carry out kidnapping, extortion, fuel theft and above all drug dealing activities,” explained David Saucedo in an interview with MILENIO.

Thus, the attacks on police officers that have been reported during 2024 in Celaya would be related to the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel since, in the consultant’s words, “it is one of the few police forces in Guanajuato that does carry out this activity of combating organized crime”.

To combat security corporations, the criminal organization headed by José Antonio Yépez Ortiz has assigned deserters from the Colombian Army, as well as members of the Grupo Escorpión of the Gulf Cartel with whom they created alliances to stop the advance of the CJNG.

(For more about ex-Colombian military personnel working with cartels in Guanajuato, Mexico, see this May 2023 report at Mexico’s El Universal from Héctor De Mauleón.)

Peru

In a hearing held this afternoon before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Peruvian judge and member of the Latin American Federation of Magistrates Oswaldo Ordóñez alerted the international community about the permanent political attacks against the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary, and made a report on all the laws in favor of organized crime and corruption approved so far by the Peruvian Congress.

… The magistrate recounted all the laws approved so far in Peru in favor of organized crime and corruption by the Congress dominated by Fuerza Popular, Peru Libre, and APP, together with other satellite blocs.

“This parliamentary majority and the Executive Power have enacted laws that modify the statute of limitations; that cut the terms in the processes of effective collaboration; that prevent the seizure of goods or materials used in illegal mining; that exclude all political parties from any criminal responsibility; that promote impunity for terrorists and ex-military; that oblige raids to be carried out with the presence of the raided person’s lawyer, and establish a new typification of the crime of organized crime”, he commented.

The magistrate commented that this new regulatory framework “has generated the exponential growth of crime and insecurity, putting the entire population at serious risk”.

Venezuela

Environmental leaders and activists agree that improving the situation for Venezuelan wildlife requires a fundamental shift in the government’s modus operandi. The government must cut ties with wildlife traffickers and actively prosecute cases of trafficking.

Cristina Burelli, founder of conservation NGO SOS Orinoco, says a lack of institutions and rule of law create favorable conditions for wildlife trafficking in Venezuela. “The only way to combat wildlife trafficking is by strengthening institutions, but that’s not going to happen under the Maduro regime. So unfortunately, until there’s a change of government, I don’t think there’s going to be any change [for wildlife],” she says.

“It has created a situation in Venezuela where nobody really cares,” she adds.

Listen to Human Rights Defenders

That’s quite a turnabout for Colombian Army Gen. Mario Montoya. In the early years of the “Plan Colombia” security buildup, Montoya was the “can-do” general whom the U.S. and Colombian governments frequently featured when they gave reporters access to military operations supported by big U.S. aid packages starting in 2000.

We now know that Montoya had a darker side of collusion with death squads, tacit backing of right-wing paramilitary groups, and—later, as Army commander—overseeing a spike in murders of civilians through relentless encouragement of high body counts. The State Department sanctions announced today further confirm this.

None of this is news to Colombia’s human rights defenders, who had been warning about Montoya’s record, and the rising number of extrajudicial killings, for years before either government began to respond.

This is yet another reminder of the importance of listening to human rights defenders.

Older Posts
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.